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This paper explores the relationship between kinship institutions and sex ratios in India at the turn
of the twentieth century. Since kinship rules varied by caste, language, religion and region, we construct
sex-ratios by these categories at the district-level using data from the 1901 Census of India for Punjab
(North), Bengal (East) and Madras (South). We find that the female to male sex ratio varied inversely
by caste-rank, rose as one moved from the North to the East and then to the South, was lower for Hindus
than Muslims, and was lower for the northern Indo-Aryan rather than the southern Dravidian speaking
peoples. We also find that the female deficit was greater in wheat growing regions and in areas with
higher rainfall and alluvial soil. We argue that these systematic patterns in the data are largely explained











St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
and NBER
soks@artsci.wustl.eduI. Introduction 
  Ever since Sen (1990) proclaimed that more than 100 million women are missing around 
the world, the case of “missing women” has generated considerable interest. In contrast to 
Europe and North America where the sex ratio (defined here as the ratio of female to male 
population) is around 1.05 or higher, the ratio in many Asian countries, such as in India, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, is as low as 0.94.
1 In many of these countries, the sex 
ratios seem to have fallen over the second half of the twentieth century with development, 
declining family size and the advent of modern technologies which facilitate self-selective 
abortion or sex-selection (Park and Cho (1995)). 
  In India and probably elsewhere in Asia, however, the case of “missing women” has deep 
historical roots. While it is difficult to identify when the problem of “missing women” first arose 
in India, British officials were well aware of the problem in North India during the mid-
nineteenth century.
2 More reliable evidence from the British censuses conducted during the late 
nineteenth century show that the problem of “missing women” was clearly a northern rather than 
a southern or an eastern problem in India. The female to male sex ratio was lowest in northern 
regions such as Punjab, equal in eastern regions such as Bengal, but was relatively high and 
favored women in southern regions such as Madras (Visaria (1961), Dyson and Moore (1987)). 
                                                 
1 Sex ratio is determined by biological as well as economic and cultural factors. From a biological perspective, 
scholars generally believe that biology favors the births of males, but the subject is under considerable debate. After 
birth, because females possess biological advantages in resisting disease, they are more likely to survive than males 
given equal levels of nutrition and health care. Thus, for any cohort, sex ratios at birth favor males, but favor 
females over time. Because Europe and North America seem to follow this pattern, scholars tend to treat the trends 
in sex ratios in these places as largely determined by biological factors. In many parts of Asia, however, where the 
male sex-bias is prevalent, biological factors are likely to play a minor role in explaining sex ratios. It its beyond the 
scope of this paper to summarize the large emerging literature on sex ratios, but we refer the reader to Norberg 
(2005), Qian (2006), Oster (2005), Kishore (1993), Murthi et. al (1995), Dyson and Moore (1983), among others. 
2 In North India, the British officials suspected that the Rajputs were practicing female infanticide during the mid-
nineteenth century (Parry (1979), Miller (1981)). In 1852, data show that among some of the highest royal clans, the 
sex ratios of girls to boys ranged from as low as 0.22 to 0.40 (Parry (1979, 216)). 
  3  Although the regional differences in sex ratios has narrowed between the northern and 
southern regions over the twentieth century, the narrowing is largely due to the convergence of 
southern sex ratios toward the northern figures. For all of India, the overall sex ratio has fallen 
from 0.972 to 0.933 between 1901 and 2001. Over this period, however, the sex ratio in the 
historically most masculine Punjab region in the North remained significantly lower than the 
national average as it ranged from a low of 0.780 to a high of 0.882. While some regions in the 
South such as Kerala continue to exhibit a significant feminine bias, the figure in Tamil Nadu 
converged toward those of the North as it went from 1.044 to 0.986 over the twentieth century. 
  Because the problem of “missing women” in India has existed for more than a century 
and a half and is an endemic and persistent feature of Indian society, there are strong reasons to 
believe that the causes of “missing women” are both historically determined and slow-moving. 
For many scholars, the family and kinship systems, which often determine the rights of women 
in traditional societies, are the most likely factors for the historically persistent pattern of 
“missing women” in India. In a well cited paper, Dyson and Moore (1987) argue that northern 
kinship system based on village exogamy led to lower autonomy of women, lower age at 
marriage, higher fertility, higher childhood female mortality and lower sex ratios.
3 By contrast, 
                                                 
3 Dyson and Moore (1987) argue that in North India, village female exogamy, male household cooperation, male 
only property inheritance, marriage based on inter-group alliance and low parental benefit from daughters all 
conspired for poor treatment of girls and women. Indeed, the reduced autonomy of women under the North Indian 
kinship system has been a persistent theme in the Indian anthropological literature (see Mandelbaum (1970)). 
Argarwal (1994) explores the importance of kinship and inheritance systems on the autonomy of women in India. 
She finds that female autonomy, sexual freedom, ownership rights in land were all closely correlated with kinship 
and inheritance systems where women’s rights were stronger. For the post-independence period, Kishore (1993) 
finds that patrilocal exogamy, measured by the marriage distance of women, is positively correlated with female to 
male child mortality ratio. Since identifying the causal kinship factors is extremely challenging, Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2001) attempt to identify the importance of patrilocal exogamy on sex ratios by using India’s green 
revolution as an exogenous technological shock. Since sons contribute to parental incomes and daughters do not, 
local advances in agricultural productivity are likely to favor boys; however, they also show that in a general 
equilibrium framework with a marriage market, a productivity increase may also improve the chances of girls as 
returns to human capital of women increases. Finally, Das Gupta et. al (2003) argue that the commonalities in the 
kinship systems in India, China and Korea help explain the persistence of low sex ratios in these countries.  
  4the southern kinship system based on cross-cousin marriages increased the autonomy of women 
and contributed to sex ratios which favored females rather than males. 
  In this paper, we delve more deeply into the relationship between kinship and sex ratios 
in India by studying sex ratios by caste, language, religion and region at the turn of the twentieth 
century.
4 From a kinship perspective, the examination of data by caste is essential since castes at 
the jati-level were endogamous and because kinship behavior was enforced along caste lines.
5 
As the castes were further distinguished by social hierarchy, occupation and income, data by 
castes also provide useful information on whether kinship behavior varied by status and income. 
We also explore sex ratios by language and religion since marriage and kinship relationships are 
likely to differ across peoples who speak different languages and practice different religions. 
Language not only facilitates communication, but it often codifies norms of kinship behavior.
6
Religious institutions also imposed strong restrictions on kinship and inheritance rules. Finally, 
since regions possess different factor endowments, economic structures and political institutions, 
marriage and kinship behavior may differ by geography. 
                                                 
4 Miller (1981) represents one of the few studies which examine the link between caste and sex ratios. She argued 
that upper castes were likely to have lower sex ratios based on their history of female infanticide and the pressures 
on property-holding families to bear sons as heirs. Based on the examination of 12 major castes in the United 
Provinces and Madras at the aggregate provincial level in 1931, she found three patterns of juvenile sex ratios: 
northern propertied castes had extreme masculinity, southern propertied castes exhibited equality or feminity, and 
that all-India unpropertied castes exhibited masculine sex ratios. However, she does not explore the link between 
caste and kinship systems. 
5 Blunt (1931, p.48): “Caste endogamy is absolutely rigid and immutable, permitting no open evasion. Sometimes 
even high castes are compelled by a lack of women to make a practice of taking low castes as wives: but in such 
cases both the husband and his caste connive at their own deception, and if they are willing to ignore custom, are 
very unwilling to be generally known.” 
6 For American anthropologists such as Morgan (1871) and Kroeber (1909), language reveals the nature of social 
and kinship organization. In the South where cross-cousin marriage is practiced, Trautman (1993, p.80-81) writes: 
the “Tamil [word] māman is mother’s brother, father’s sister’s husband, and spouse’s father, a geneological 
relationships which are equated by a presumption that every marriage is between cross-cousins... The Indo-Aryan 
[northern] scheme could not be more different. Hindi māma, almost certainly a cognate of the Tamil word, also 
means mother’s brother, but Hindi has quite separate terms for father’s sister’s husband (phūphā) and spouse’s 
father (sasur), and the remaining contents of this generation are differently ordered than in the Tamil... [T]he rules 
of marriage, the Indo-Aryan system frames these in terms of a notion of proximity, a kind of law of prohibited 
degrees rather like our onw: near kinsmen may not marry. In Dravidian, on the other hand, it is not proximity but 
kind of relationship which constrains marriageability.” 
  5  We construct our data from the 1901 Census of India for the provinces of Punjab (North), 
Bengal (East) and Madras (South). Using detailed sub-caste or jati-level data for each province at 
the district level, we find that sex ratios differed significantly by caste, language and region. The 
most significant feature of the data is the variation in sex ratio by regions. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of sex ratio across the provinces of India in 1901. It bears out the North-South 
disparity in sex ratio. The sex ratio was the lowest in the North followed by the East and then the 
South where the sex ratio favored females. Figure 3 shows the sex ratio distribution across the 
districts of our study area. This regional pattern was extremely robust. The pattern was observed 
when we control for district fixed-effects and when we control for differences in caste 
composition. In addition, even for each caste, language and religious categories, the same 
regional pattern emerged. 
The data also show that sex ratios varied systematically by caste, language and religion. 
Sex-ratios varied inversely by caste rank. In each region, the higher religious or landowning 
castes possessed the lowest sex ratios whereas the lower artisan and menial service castes had the 
highest sex ratios. Sex ratios were lower among those who spoke the northern Indo-Aryan 
languages as compared to those who spoke the southern Dravidian language. Even when we 
control for geography, there seems to be systematic variations across groups who speak different 
languages. The data show that sex ratios varied by religion. The Hindus had significantly lower 
sex ratios than Muslims in Punjab and Bengal, but not in Madras where the Muslim population 
was extremely small. Sex ratios were significantly lower in districts with higher rainfall and 
greater amounts of alluvial soil. While the length of British rule is negatively correlated with sex 
ratios, the relationship was not statistically significant. 
  6  We argue that the examination of sex ratios by caste, language, religion and region 
generally confirm the view that kinship systems played an important role in determining sex 
ratios in India. Regional differences in family and kinship institutions were the most important 
factor. The sex ratio was lowest in the North where the kinship system provided the least 
autonomy of women, intermediate in the East where the northern kinship was slightly modified, 
and was the highest in the South where the women’s autonomy was thought to have been the 
strongest. The inverse relationship between sex ratios and caste rank also suggest the importance 
of kinship. Women’s autonomy was significantly lower for the higher as compared the lower 
caste women. The former were not allowed to work outside of the home, not allowed to initiate 
divorce, and their sexual and social behavior were highly regulated by the kin-group. Finally, the 
variations in sex ratios by language and religion strongly suggest that northern kinship system 
contributed significantly to lower sex ratios in India. 
  This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present our theoretical framework for 
studying the relationship between family and kinship institutions and sex ratios. In section III, we 
examine the relationship between kinship institutions and gender bargaining power in India 
In section IV, we examine the empirical link between kinship and sex ratio by constructing data 
on sex ratios by caste, religion, language and region in India. Since the data on sex ratio by caste 
are assembled at the district-level, we can also control for district fixed-effects. In section V, we 
explore the origins of the regional divergence of family and kinship institutions in India. In 




  7II. A Framework for Studying Kinship Institutions and Sex-Ratios 
  Pre-modern India can be usefully characterized as a “natural state.” In a natural state, as 
defined by North et. al (2006), the political elites form alliances with economic elites to create 
rents by limiting economic entry and then use those rents to stablize the political system to limit 
violence and provide order.
7 In India and elsewhere, the elites, in addition to their economic and 
military resources, used religious and kinship institutions to establish informal norms and beliefs 
to define property rights and resolve problems of cooperation and conflict (Greif (2004)). 
Because the formal bureaucratic organization of the elites was relatively limited in India, the 
informal institution of religion, caste, and kinship played a paramount role in the lives of local 
peasants.  
  Importantly, the family and kinship institutions possessed significant distributional 
consequences for different members of society, especially between men and women (Stone 
(1998)). In Europe, a kinship system based on bilineal descent, nuclear family and an inheritance 
system which gave women the right to inherit property contributed to a relatively strong 
autonomy of women. In many parts of Asia, however, a kinship system based on patrilineal 
descent, the importance of joint family, inability of women to inherit property, restrictions on 
widow remarriage, and severe restrictions on women’s sexual behavior and general conduct all 
contributed to a relatively weak autonomy of women. Because the distribution of family 
resources between the sexes depends on the bargaining power of men and women within 
marriage and kin-group, the kinship systems are likely to influence sex ratios. 
                                                 
7 In India, the political elites, the Royals, the Mughals, and even the British, formed alliances with local landowning 
elites. In return for land taxes from landowners, the political elites provided order and stability. However, India was 
characterized by many “natural states.” Since the levels of military and bureacratic powers of the political elites 
varied considerably over time and across space, natural states varied in their geographic scope and in their nature of 
alliances between the political and economic elites. While India under British rule became more centralized over 
time, India at the turn of the twentieth century was very much organized as a natural state (Kapur and Kim (2006)). 
  8  We motivate our analysis on kinship and sex ratios using Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) 
separate spheres family bargaining model. In this marriage model, the preferences of husband, h, 
and the wife, w, are represented by Uh(xh, q1, q2) and Uw(x2, q1, q2) where xh and xw are private 
goods and q1 and q2 are public goods. The demands for private and public goods are derived by 
maximizing the Nash social welfare function: N = (Uh-Th)(Uw-Tw) where Th and Tw are husband 
and wife’s respective threat points. As is well known, the distribution of resources between the 
spouses depends upon the threat point, Th and Tw (see Figure 1). 
  Unlike the divorce-threat bargaining model (Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and 
Horney (1981)), where the threat point is determined by outside marriage opportunities after 
divorce, the threat point in the spheres bargaining model is internal to the marriage. In the 
spheres model, traditional social norms specify division of labor by gender so that public good q1 
falls on husband’s traditional sphere whereas public good q2 falls on wife’s sphere. The threat 
points Th and Tw are then determined by a non-cooperative Cournot model where the husband 
chooses xh and q1 given q2 chosen by the wife and where the wife chooses xw and q2 given q1 
chosen by the husband. Since divorce was highly restricted in India, an important implication of 
the spheres model for our paper is that the bargaining power within marriage is determined by 
who controls the resources within marriage rather than by the spousal incomes after divorce. 
  In the next section, we argue that kinships systems, by determining the gender threat 
points within and outside of marriage, significantly influence the distribution of resources 
between husbands and wives and more generally between males and females within households 
and kin groups. We further argue that female bargaining power is likely to be highly correlated 
  9with family resources devoted to female members of the family and are likely to significantly 
impact health, nutrition and mortality of females.
8
 
III. Kinship Institutions, Family Bargaining and Gender Threat Points 
  By placing restrictions on marriageable partners, rules of descent, and rules of residence, 
the kinship systems define the nature of the bargaining power among different family, kin-group 
and endogamous members. Numerous scholars believe that these traditional institutions of 
kinship play a major role in determining the bargaining power of women (Miller (1981), 
Agarwal (1994, 1997), Folbre (1997) and others). Table 1 presents the proposed relationship 
between kinship and womens’ bargaining power. 
  Anthropologists believe that the bargaining power of women is lower in patrilineal, 
patrilocal as compared to matrilineal, matrilocal societies.
9 In patrilineal society, since 
consanguine women cannot reproduce the lineage, they are less valuable as allies; however, in 
matrilineal societies, since sisters reproduce lineages, they are likely to form strong bonds.
10 
Women’s bargaining power is also likely to be lower in patrilocal rather than in matrilocal 
societies. When residence is patrilocal, women tend to live further away from their natal homes 
and have less support of her natal family as compared to when residence is matrilocal.
11
                                                 
8 See Thomas (1990, 1995), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997).  
9 In anthropology, there are two major themes: descent and alliance (Fox (1967)). The descent perspective, 
identified with the British school of social anthropology, sees kinship as the primary mechanism for recruiting 
property-owning, residential and political groups. The alliance perspective, identified with Claude Levy-Strauss, 
emphasizes the role of alliance formation through the trade and distribution of women. The bargaining power of 
family members are likely to be influenced by the restrictions on the alliance formation within and across families 
and kin-groups as defined by different kinship systems. Also see Stone (1997). 
10 Thus, according to Fox (1967), the essence of the patrilineal society is to ‘gain control over the wife,’ whereas for 
the matrilineal society, it is to ‘hang onto sisters.’ In patrilineal systems, men attempt to gain rights over sexual, 
domestic and reproductive services of the wife; in matrilineal systems, men do not have an incentive to do so since 
they cannot control lineage reproduction.   
11 Most patrilineal societies are patrilocal, but there seems to be a greater residence variation for matrilineal 
societies. In the latter societies, Fox (1967) argues that women’s bargaining power is higher in matrilocal as 
compared to avunculocal societies where the married couple resides with the man’s mother’s eldest brother. The 
  10  Women’s bargaining position seems to be better in societies where cross-cousin 
marriages are allowed as compared to societies which restrict marriages to non-kins. Since 
women marry into familiar kin-networks rather than to strange families, they are likely to have 
more allies. Women’s property rights seem to be positively correlated with marriages where 
women are in close physical proximity to their natal home which is often the case in cross-cousin 
marriages (Agarwal (1994)). In addition, in cross-cousin marriages, due to the double-descent 
system, family property always remains within the kin group even if women are granted rights to 
property as the joint family property is not threatened to devolve with marriage. 
  Kinship Organization in India 
  In India, kinship organization and female autonomy varied by caste, language, religion 
and region (Karve (1953)). While scholars continue to debate as to why the institution of caste 
arose and persisted over time, the caste, with few exceptions, was an endogamous group whose 
members were often related to each other by ties of blood or marriage.
12 Within any given 
locality, endogamous caste leaders or caste assemblies enforced the family, marriage and kinship 
norms.
13 In an agricultural village economy where land was important, the higher castes owned 
much of the land whereas the lower castes were artisans, agricultural laborers, and service 
providers. The kinship ideals are held by all groups, but have more influence among the higher 
                                                                                                                                                             
alliance group in matrilocal societies is mother-daughter-sister whereas in the avunculocal societies, it is brother-
sister-nephew.   
12 According to Lal (2005), the caste system arose in India around the end of the sixth century because it provided 
an enduring political and economic solution for the Aryans who migrated and settled in the Indo-Gangetic plains. 
Because the Aryans faced abundant land but shortage of labor, the caste system provided a method of incorporating 
native tribes as agricultural laborers. Most importantly, it was a decentralized system of control based on local 
enforcement through the endogamous castes. More recently, Freitas (2006) aruges that the caste system persisted 
because it facilitated trade in services as it lowered the costs of sharing information and enforcing service contracts. 
Castes may also persist because they provide mutual social insurance (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005)). 
13 Dasgupta (1986), in his study of the lower caste bagdies of villages in Bengal, report that caste councils dealt 
with various offenses including marriages and sexual relationships which deviated from kinship norms. While caste 
kinship rules are not entirely rigid, deviants are punished either through fines or ex-communication. Of the 560 
marriages for which data were collected in 1960-1961, only 23 deviated from kinship norms. 
  11castes (Mandelbaum (1970)).
14 In addition, a woman’s bargaining position within a family or 
kin-group is thought to have been higher among the lower rather than the higher castes.
15
  The fact that parents had significantly greater bargaining power over their children in 
India also contributed to the lower bargaining power of women. Throughout most of India, a 
woman’s social status and identity was significantly correlated with marriage and most marriages 
were arranged by parents. Forced, arranged marriages generally lowered the bargaining power of 
women relative to parents and extended kin-group (Mathur (2007)). In addition, the extremely 
low age of Indian women at marriage, which ranged from 11.4 to 15.3 in 1901 (Agarwala 
(1951)), also contributed to their lower bargaining power. 
  From a regional perspective, scholars believe that the most distinctive difference in 
kinship organization was between North and South India (Karve (1953), Dyson and Moore 
(1987)).
16 Because the northern system was patrilineal and patrilocal whereas the southern 
system was based on cross-cousin marriages, scholars generally believe that women’s autonomy 
was significantly lower in the North than in the South. In addition, a woman’s position was 
further compromised in the North by the gotra-system (or the marriage avoidance with sapinda-
                                                 
14 Kolenda (1987) investigates the variations in the prevalence of joint-families by caste and region. She finds that 
the share of familes organized as joint families is positively correlated with the prohibition of legal divorce initiated 
by the wife, the dowry system, control of land and resources by patrileages as well as few other factors. In general, 
these factors are negatively correlated with caste rank so that the prevalence of joint families are least observed 
among the lowest caste groups. 
15 Gough (1956) argues that in a Tamil village in Tanjore, the women of the low castes, especially the adi dravidas, 
were almost equal to men. Unlike the local Brahmans, their patrilineal group is very shallow, residence is not strictly 
patrilocal, women are economically independent, receive bridewealth at marriage, and break the authority of the 
fathers shortly after puberty. In these low caste families, rank is underplayed, there is equivalence of brothers since 
they do not fight for inheritance and women are not cut-off from their natal families and the residence unit is more 
likely to be an elementary- rather than a joint-family. By contrast, the Brahman women could not initiate divorce 
and could not work outside of the home. Also see (Kolenda (1987), Mandelbaum (1970), Miller (1981)). 
16 In her important study, Karve (1953) identified four regional systems - northern, central, eastern and southern -  
which overlapped with the dominant languages in these regions - Indo-Aryan (north and central), Austro-Asiatic 
(east) and Dravidian (south and central). The most distinctive difference in kinship organization ocurred between 
north and south as close-kin marriages were forbidden in the former but allowed in the latter. Yet, despite this 
significant difference, scholars such as Dumont (1983) and Trautmann (1981) see many structural similarities 
between the northern and southern kinship systems (Uberoi (1993)). The central region exhibited a mixture of 
northern and southern systems whereas the less important eastern system was identified with tribal peoples such as 
the Mundari. 
  12kin), hypergamy, early arranged marriages, village exogamy, restrictions on daughters marrying 
into same villages, levirate, restrictions on widow remarriage, importance of joint family, the 
strict restrictions on the behavior and movement of women, and the severance of relationship 
between the women and her natal family.
17
  The southern kinship system varied more considerably. While most societies were 
patrilineal and patrilocal, some such as the Nayars in Kerala were matrilineal and matrilocal. 
However, the prevalence of close-kin marriages significantly increased the autonomy of women 
in the South. For large numbers of castes, a man’s marriage preference was as follows: first, his 
elder sister’s daughter; second, his father’s sister’s daughter; and third, his mother’s brother’s 
daughter. However, there was a general taboo against marriage with a man’s mother’s sister’s 
daughter or a man’s younger sister’s daughter. Marriage between close-kin narrowed the circle 
of kin-groups and married women lived near their natal families and continued to have close 
relationships with them after marriage. While levirate was prohibited, widow remarriage, except 
for the Brahmins, was allowed. 
  The regional differences in inheritance practices also provided lower access to property 
for women in the North than in the East and the South (Agarwal (1994)).
18 In North India, 
according to the customary Hindu inheritance laws found in the ancient legal treatises, the 
                                                 
17 In the North, high castes in good position are bound by the rule of Sapinda which prohibits marriage of two 
persons who have a common ancestor not more than 6 degrees removed on the male side or 4 degrees removed on 
the female side. Since relatives were likely to be in closer proximity, the Sapinda rule increased the distance of 
marriage for brides. For lower castes, the rules were less restrictive and followed the avuncular rule which prohibits 
unions of paternal and maternal uncle and aunt. It bars marriages between any first-cousins or between a woman and 
any descendant of any of her first cousins (Blunt (1931, p.60)). Also see Miller (1954) and Gould (1960) for 
discussion and evidence of marriage distances of high and low castes. 
18 Kolenda (1987) argues that the regional variations in inheritance laws had a significant impact on when joint 
families dis-integrated. In the South, the break-up occurs when sons, shortly after marriage, seek their shares of land 
and establish separate nuclear families; in the East, the break-up occurs upon the marriage of brothers or upon the 
father’s death; in the North, however, the joint family of brothers tended to be much more stable. Thus, the existence 
and stability of the joint family was the strongest among the northern Rajputs, Thakurs and the Jats. For empirical 
analysis on joint family structure and household partitions, see Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1984), Khuda (1985) 
and Foster (1993). 
  13Dhamashastras and their commentaries, except for the succession of kings, inheritance was 
multigeniture rather than primogeniture.
19 Under the Mitakshara legal doctrine which held sway 
in most of this region, sons became equal co-parceners of the joint family or ancestral property 
(as opposed to self-acquired individual property) at birth whereas daughters were only entitled to 
maintenance and marriage expenses. 
  In the East, however, under Dayabhaga law adopted in Bengal and Assam, sons did not 
acquire rights to property by birth but only at the death of the father. As a result, fathers 
possessed significant bargaining power over their children as he could control the size and share 
of property obtained by sons.
20 For women, their rights to property were slightly more favorable 
under Dayabhaga as a chaste widow in the absence of sons inherited the rights to manage the 
property although she was not given the rights to alienate it. While property rights of women 
were limited throughout most of India including the South, there were at least three regions in 
South India where pockets of communities practiced matrilineal and bilateral inheritance.
21
  While some scholars such as Goody (1973), Tambiah (1973) and Botticini and Siow 
(1993) interpret dowries as a form of pre-mortem inheritance for women, Agarwal (1994) argues 
that only a handful of groups in South India practiced dowry in this form. Miller (1981), based 
on a survey of ethnographic evidence, finds that while dowry was practiced throughout India, its 
practice was more prevalent in the North and among the propertied classes. In addition, in the 
North, Agarwal (1994) writes that the dowry was transferred to the groom’s parents whereas in 
the South, it remained the property of the wife. 
                                                 
19 The two legal treatises are based on the Yajnavalkya-smrti. The Mitaksara, written by Vajnanesvara around the 
11th century is an elaborate commentary on Yajnavalkya-smrti; however, the Dayabhaga was written sometime after 
the 11th century by Jimutavahana. 
20 The doctrine of customary right of property by birth limited the father’s power over property. Jimutavahana 
favored smrti-texts which gave sole property rights to the father (Sontheimer (1977)). 
21 In South India, Nangudi Vellalars of Tamil Nadu practiced bilateral inheritance and several groups including the 
Nayars and Tiyyars of Kerala, and the Mappilas of north Kerala practiced matrilineal inheritance. In Northeast India, 
the Garos, Kahsis and the Lalungs also practiced matrilineal descent (Agarwal (1984)). 
  14  Finally, there were significant differences in kinship and inheritance rules between the 
Hindus and Muslims in India. The Muslim kinship system shared similarities with the southern 
Dravidian system in that close cousin marriages were preferred and women were allowed to 
inherit property.
22 However, male-biased social hierarchy also existed in Muslim families as a 
son inherited twice as much a daughter, a brother twice as much as a sister, and a husband twice 
as much as a wife (Nasir and Kalla (2006)). 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence on Kinship and Sex-Ratios in India 
  This section presents the empirical evidence on sex-ratios by caste, religion, language and 
regions for three British India provinces - Punjab, Bengal and Madras - using the data from the 
1901 Census of India. While the British collected data on castes in the earlier censuses of 1865, 
1872 and 1881, the caste definitions were based on the four-fold Varna categorization of 
Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras.
23 In 1891, however, due to the influence of 
Nesfield (1885), Ibbetson (1881) and others, census officials collected detailed caste data by 
occupations.
24 The ‘jati’ sub-caste definitions used between 1891 and 1931 are useful for our 
study because a ‘jati’ is endogamous. Bayly (1999) also notes that the counting of women was a 
great novelty in India and that it was not until 1872 when women were included as members of 
individual castes by the compilers of local population districts. 
  We construct data at the district-level for each of the three provinces. Since data on 
population by caste, language and religion are available only for the aggregate female and male 
                                                 
22 Bittle (2002) reports that 23% of Muslims in India practiced consanguineous marriages in 1992-1993. For other 
religious groups, the figures were 17.1% for Buddhists, 10.6% for Hindus, 10.3% for Christians, 4.3% for Jains, and 
1.5% for Sikhs. 
23 Census procedure for collecting data on caste changed from decade to decade. In 1881, the census enumerators 
were instructed to collect data for 207 castes for whose populations were 100,000 or more. Castes were organized 
under the varna classfication, but were also grouped into various occupations. 
24 Two important views of castes emerged in India. Risley (1892) and Thurston (1909) held a racial view whereas 
Crooke (1896), Ibbetson (1916), Logan (1887), and Blunt (1931) held an occupational view. 
  15persons rather than by different age-groups, we construct sex ratios by dividing the former by the 
latter. Using the anthropological documents of the British Census we categorize the numerous 
sub-castes into broad social or occupational categories: religious, landowner, cultivator, 
professional, trader, artisans (and service), agricultural laborer, and unknown (see Appendix I for 
detailed classification).
25 Similarly, using the 1901 Census reports and various other sources we 
classify the different languages into the following categories: Aryan (North, East, South), 
Dravidian, Munda, Tibetan, Pahari (North, East), Tribal (North, East, South), foreign and 
unknown (see Appendix II). For religion, we examine sex ratios by Hindus and Muslims as the 
other religious categories were sufficiently small. 
  Since sex ratio is measured using the aggregate population figures for females and males,  
this figure can be influenced by a variety of factors. Visaria (1961) presents a detailed 
investigation of the causes of variations in sex ratios found in the Censuses of India between 
1901 and 1941. Based on a rich array of direct and indirect evidence, Visaria concludes the root 
cause of low female to male sex ratio is most likely due to female disadvantage in mortality after 
birth.
26 While the data on age-specific death rates indicate that female disadvantage is 
concentrated between the ages of 15-40, the data also show that the regional differences in 
                                                 
25 For Punjab, we follow Ibbetson (1916); for Bengal, Risley (1892); for Madras, Thurston (1909). 
26 Visaria (1961) systematically investigates the various potential determinants of the aggregate population sex 
ratios including the omission of females from the censuses, migration, differentials in sex ratios at birth, and 
differentials in sex ratios after birth. First, based on special censuses conducted in regions where reported sex ratio 
was particularly low, there is considerable evidence that the sex ratio is not caused by under-reporting of females. 
Second, given that internal migration in India was extremely low, migration is unlikely to significantly affect 
aggregate population sex ratios. For example, in Punjab, in-migration from villages of the same district constituted 
only 2.8% of total population whereas in-migration from other districts constituted a mere 0.05%. Moreover, 
migration was evenly distributed between female and male migration (see Report on Census of India 1901, Punjab).  
Third, while birth registration data seem to suggest that there are significant variations in sex ratios at birth, Visaria 
concludes that these differences are likely caused by biases in registration rather than in actual births. In particular, 
in maculine biased regions, births of girls are likely to be under-reported. When sex ratios are calculated using live 
birth records from hospital centers, the regional variation in sex ratios diminish considerably. Finally, at least for 
Punjab, there seems to be reliable evidence that female disadvantage in mortality is experienced throughout the 
entire lifespan. While it is difficult to determine the exact causes of excess female mortality, Visaria considers the 
effects of childbearing, famines and diseases such as tuberculosis. 
  16female/male mortality is concentrated in the early ages between 0-15. In Appendix I, we also 
examine the sex ratios by different age-cohorts for the three provinces under our study. 
  Table 2 presents the general population descriptive statistics for the three provinces. The 
average district population was around 0.4 million in Punjab, 1.4 million in Madras, and 1.5 
million in Bengal.
27 Population density was highest in Bengal with 413 people per square mile, 
followed by Madras, 270, and Punjab, 179. In terms of the religious diversity, Punjab’s 
population was composed of 42% Hindus and 50% Muslims whereas the figures for Bengal were 
63% and 33%, respectively, and for Madras was 89% and 6%, respectively.
28 In terms of caste 
and language, however, the data show that Punjab was culturally more homogenous than the 
other two regions. Punjab had significantly fewer languages and caste groups than Bengal and 
Madras. Although Bengal had a much larger number of castes, it is likely that Madras was 
culturally more varied as a region, its people spoke 75 different languages as compared to 45 for 
Bengal. However, within any given district, the average number of different languages spoken 
was slightly higher for Bengal than for Madras. 
  As noted by numerous writers, India was a land of agricultural villages. In 1901, there 
were 32,663 villages in Punjab, 203,476 villages in Bengal and 54,605 villages in Madras, and 
each village contained about 622, 367 and 706 persons, respectively (Table 2). While village-
level data on caste are unavailable for 1901, anthropologists have conducted numerous village-
level studies during the mid-twentieth century (see Appendix IV). These studies provide a useful 
picture of caste organization at the village-level. In the villages in all regions, the data show that 
the higher castes own most of the land, but the landowning castes differ by region. In the North, 
                                                 
27 The summary statistics for Punjab include North West Frontier Provinces although in our analysis we focus only 
on the part of Punjab in the British territory. 
28 Other religious groups - Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Parsis, Buddhists, Jews and Tribals  - formed a very small 
minority in most regions. 
  17the landowning castes are dominated by Rajputs, Jats, and Thakars; in the East and the South, the 
landowning castes are dominated by Brahmans. In addition, especially in Punjab, the landowning 
castes significantly outnumber other castes in their villages whereas in the East and the South, 
the upper castes are significantly outnumbered by those in the middle and lower castes.  
  Because the caste categories, at least from an occupational point of view, are not strictly 
comparable across regions, we must exercise some caution when interpreting the variations in 
sex ratios by castes. For example, the composition of the religious and landowning castes differ 
somewhat across the regions. In the East and the South, as noted above, the Brahmans, who have 
been included in the religious category in our study, also owned significant amounts of land but 
not in the North. As a result, the landowning castes in the North (Rajputs and Jats) are likely to 
be somewhat higher in rank than the landowning castes in the East (Sadgop, Chaudhuri, Ahir 
etc.) and South (Vellala, Lingayats etc.). Also, some occupational castes such as fishers and 
traders are prevalent in the South but not in the East and the North. Nevertheless, these broad 
caste categories should provide a useful picture of sex ratios by kinship, status and occupation. 
  Table 3 presents data on sex ratios by caste constructed at the district-level for Punjab, 
Bengal and Madras. Despite some concerns on the comparability of the caste categories across 
regions, the data show a remarkable pattern of sex ratios by caste and region. Sex ratios varied 
systematically by both caste rank and by region. Within each region, sex ratios varied inversely 
by caste rank. Sex ratios were significantly lower for the religious and landowning castes but 
significantly higher for the artisans, laborers and service castes. Moreover, within each caste 
category, sex ratio declined systematically as one moved from the North (Punjab) to the 
Northeast (Bengal) and then to the South (Madras). 
  18  For all regions, as shown in Figure 4, sex ratios improved in favor of females as one 
moves along the caste rank from the higher landowners to lower ranking menial service castes. 
For the religious and landowning castes, there were on average 947 and 937 females per 1,000 
males for religious and landowning castes respectively; however, for artisans and service 
workers, the respective figures were 987 and 1,026. In addition, as shown in Figure 5, sex ratios 
for every caste rose as one moved from Punjab to Bengal and then to Madras. For the religious 
caste, females per 1,000 males rose from 822 in Punjab to 975 in Bengal to 1,004 in Madras; 
similarly, for the service caste the figures went from 873 in Punjab to 1034 in Bengal to 1,123 in 
Madras. Thus, for the study of sex ratios in India, it is important to study the data by castes. 
  For Bengal, based on Risley’s (1892) ethnographic evidence, we find limited correlation 
between caste rank and the practice of dowry suggesting only a partial correlation between 
dowry and sex ratios. Risley’s volumes contain information on the practice of dowry or bride 
price for about 111 castes.
29 While we find that 100% of the higher caste religious and 
professional castes practiced dowries as compared to only 0%, 12% and 33% for the lower caste 
agricultural laborers, artisans and service workers respectively, we also find that the frequency of 
dowry practice among the other higher castes such as landowners, cultivators and traders were 
relatively low at 13%, 21% and 25% respectively. In addition, all of the tribal castes in the 
sample practiced bride price but their sex ratio was lower than that of the cultivating and 
professional castes. 
  Table 4 presents the population sex ratios by religion for the three regions. The data 
suggest that regional differences in sex ratios seem more important than the religious differences. 
                                                 
29 For those castes for which the practice of dowry or bride price could be identified in Risley (1892), we find the 
following distribution. The number of castes who practice dowry rather than bride price out of the total identified 
castes by groups are as follows: for religious, 5 of 5; for landowner, 1 of 8; for cultivator, 4 of 19; for for trader, 2 of 
8; for professional, 2 of 2; for agricultural laborer, 3 of 26; for service, 2 of 6; and for tribal, 0 of 20. 
  19For each religious group, sex ratio rises from Punjab to Bengal to Madras. However, there were 
important differences in sex ratios by religion in Punjab and Bengal. In Punjab, the Sikhs who 
comprise about 9% of the population had by far the lowest sex ratio of 0.77, and were followed 
by Hindus at 0.845 and then Muslims at 0.877. In Bengal, however, where the Muslim figure 
might be influenced by migration, Muslims had a lower sex ratio than Hindus. In Madras, the sex 
ratios of the three religious groups – Hindus, Christians and Muslims- were relatively similar. 
Table 5 presents data on sex ratios by language for Punjab, Bengal and Madras. Since 
regional populations are relatively homogenous in terms of language, it is difficult to disentangle 
the effects of language and the effects of geography. For example, the data show that in Punjab, 
most of the population, except for those of tribal origins, speak only the northern Indo-Aryan 
language; thus, the variation in sex ratio by language is likely to be confounded by regional 
variations in sex ratios unrelated to language. However, when we examine the sex ratio of the 
Central Aryan language speaking peoples who are found throughout India, the data suggest that 
the dominant factor in sex ratio is geographic rather than language orientation. In Madras, the 
sex ratio of the Central Aryan speaking peoples was 0.941 whereas in Bengal and Madras, the 
figures were 0.791 and 0.715 respectively. 
Yet, even though the most important difference in sex-ratio may be geographical, there 
seems to be some variation in sex ratio by language as well. In general, the sex ratio is much 
lower for the northern Indo-Aryan as compared to southern Dravidian languages within each 
region. When we examine the overall distribution of sex ratio across the different languages, we 
find that the languages of Northern origin, viz. North Aryan (found mainly in Punjab), Central 
Aryan (found mainly in Rajputana), Northern Hilly, and Northern Tribal languages, perform 
much worse compared to those of Southern Dravidian origin or Eastern origin. Particularly, 
  20while the Central and North Aryan languages of the North had only 797 and 786 women to 1,000 
men, respectively, Tamil, Telegu and other Dravidian languages of the South had 945, 969 and 
968 women per 1,000 men, respectively. 
  Since we constructed data on sex ratios by caste, religion, and language at the district-
level for the three regions, we are able to present descriptive statistical analysis which control for 
regional and district fixed-effects. We present these regressions in Tables 6-9. 
  In Table 6A, we present simple dummy variable regressions where sex ratios of different 
castes are compared with the artisan castes as the omitted category. In Punjab, for every 1000 
males, compared with the artisans, the religious, landowner, and trader castes had 82, 60 and 41 
fewer females respectively; in Bengal, the deficiency was 19, 75, and 37; in Madras, it was 42, 
26, and 38. However, there were more significant variations across the regions, especially 
between Punjab and the other two regions. For the cultivator and agricultural laborer castes, sex-
ratio was significantly lower than artisans in Punjab but not in Bengal or Madras; for the service 
castes on the other hand, the sex ratio was significantly higher than the artisan castes in Bengal 
and Madras but not in Punjab.  
   When we pool the data for all three provinces and control for district fixed-effects, we 
find very similar results. Table 6B indicate that the religious, landowner, traders and cultivator 
castes had significantly lower sex ratios than artisans, but that opposite was true of service 
castes. The data show that even after controlling for caste composition and district fixed-effects, 
Punjab had 161 fewer females per 1,000 males than Madras whereas the figure was 51 for 
Bengal. When we control for the caste population size, we find that women have fared worse in 
larger-sized castes as higher population led to lower sex-ratios. We also find that the sex ratio 
was significantly lower for the Hindu castes as compared to the Muslim castes. 
  21  In Table 7, we examine sex ratios by religion. The regressions indicate that even when 
we control for district fixed-effects and caste composition, the Muslims had a favorable sex ratio 
than Hindus in Punjab and Bengal. In Madras, where there were few Muslims, there were no 
significant differences in the sex ratios by religion. Interestingly, our data also show that 
variations in sex ratios by caste were observed for Hindus but not for Muslims. 
  In Table 8A, we analyze the relationship between sex ratios by language groups. Since 
there is little geographic overlap of languages in different regions, the regressions do not include 
geographic dummy variables. We find that sex ratios among the southern Dravidian languages 
differed significantly from those who spoke Aryan languages in the Northern and Northwestern 
regions, but not for languages of Aryan origin in the East or the South. In column (1) we omit all 
the Dravidian languages and run the summary variable regression. It shows that compared to 
Dravidian languages, Central Aryan and North Aryan had 155 and 132 fewer females per 1000 
males. On the other hand the Munda languages had 150 more females. In column (2) we further 
break the Dravidian languages into the 4 major southern languages of Canarese, Malayalese, 
Tamil and Telegu. In this case the omitted category is all other Dravidian languages. Again we 
find the Central and North Aryan languages had fewer females than Dravidian. Moreover, except 
for the Malayalese speaking peoples in the Malabar region who had significantly lower sex ratios 
than the other Dravidian languages, there were no observable differences compared to peoples 
who spoke in the other eleven categories. 
  Since there is little geographic overlap of languages in different regions, it is difficult to 
identify the impact of language on sex ratio. In Table 8B, we overcome this constraint to an 
extent by using the 1921 Census data to construct groups of bordering districts which enable us 
to track people of same language across different provinces. For the districts in the provinces of 
  22Rajputana, Kashmir and United Provinces which bordered the districts in the provinces of 
Punjab, we constructed sex ratio by different language groups. Since all of these districts should 
exhibit little geographic variation, we should be able to identify the effect of language 
controlling for geographic effects. The data show that sex ratios differ by language. As compared 
to the Punjabi language speaking societies, there were relatively more females within the Hindi, 
Hilly, Rajasthani and Gujrati speaking communities. However, even after controlling for the 
language variation, there were significantly fewer females in Punjab compared to Kashmir but 
not against the other two provinces.  
  Since all the regressions bear out the significant geographic variation in sex ratios which 
remains unexplained by variation in caste distribution, we examine the role of agricultural 
variation across the regions in determining the widely varying sex ratios. Bardhan (1974) notes, 
that the economic value of women is driven by differences in female intensity of agricultural 
production. He argues that rice is more intensive in female labor compared to wheat and hence 
survival chances of girls should be higher in rice growing areas compared to wheat growing 
areas. In Table 9 we use area under crops data from 1901 to see how sex ratio varied with rice or 
wheat intensity of agriculture. We find that as the proportion of area under wheat cultivation 
increases, sex ratio in a district falls. However, no significant relation emerges between rice 
cultivation and sex ratio. 
  We further examine the implication of geographic and climatic variation in determining 
sex ratios. In particular, we regress sex ratios on various geographic and climatic characteristics 
such as rainfall, soil (alluvial, red, black), coastal dummy, and the length of British rule. The 
results are shown in Table 10. While these geographic measures are crude, they are likely to 
capture the variations in agricultural crops (Kapur and Kim (2006)). We find that higher rainfall 
  23and the presence of alluvial soil are negatively correlated with sex ratios.
30 More importantly, 
even after controlling for possible geographic and historical factors, Punjab a had significantly 
lower sex ratio than Madras, suggesting that cultural factors such as kinship systems are likely to 
be important even after controlling for economic factors. Interestingly, the length of British rule 
was negatively correlated with sex ratios but was not statistically significant.  
  In summary, we argue that the data confirm the view that family, kinship and inheritance 
institutions in India contributed significantly to determining the sex ratios in India. As noted by 
numerous scholars, sex ratio was the lowest in the North (Punjab) where the society was 
patrilineal, patrilocal and extremely exogamous and was highest in the South (Madras) where the 
practice of close kin marriages provided more favorable kinship relationships for females. 
Moreover, in the East (Bengal), where the northern kinship and inheritance rules were modified, 
sex ratio improved over those in the North but remained lower than those in the South. 
  Since the ideal norms of kinship were held more strongly by the higher castes, the inverse 
relationship between sex ratios and caste rank provides additional evidence on the importance of 
kinship. However, because caste rank is also correlated with wealth and income, it is difficult to 
separately identify the effects of wealth and kinship on sex ratios. Women from low castes often 
earned significant family income so that their bargaining power within the family and kin-group 
were likely to be high whereas women of high caste typically did not bring in any income. Yet, it 
is also important to note that kinship norms had a significant influence on the labor market of 
women. High caste women were forbidden to work outside of the home and their bargaining 
power was based on the rearing of children, especially sons. 
                                                 
30 However, Rose (1999) finds that favorable rainfall shocks, defined as transitory deviation from its 21-year mean 
for each district, were positively correlated with higher survival rates of girls relative to boys for India between 
1969-1971. 
  24  In the South, however, the low sex ratio of the higher castes poses a puzzle. If the cross-
cousin marriages were taken more seriously by the higher castes, then one might expect a higher 
sex ratio for the higher castes. We believe that the low sex ratio of the high caste Brahmans in 
the South may be accounted for by the fact that the Brahmans brought with them the vestiges of 
northern family norms when they migrated south. Even though the southern Brahmans adopted 
cross-cousin marriages, Gough (1956) argues that the Brahman family relationships were 
characterized by northern family hierarchy.
31
  Finally, the examination of sex ratios by language and religion seem to indicate the 
importance of kinship. Even when we control for geography, societies who speak the northern 
Indo-Aryan language, especially Punjabi, exhibited significantly lower sex ratios. Similarly, even 
in the North and East, Muslims whose kinship norms were similar to those of the Dravidian 
South possessed lower sex ratios than their Hindu counterparts, even after we control for caste 
rank. However, while our data analysis do not include the Sikhs, the very low sex ratios observed 
for the Sikhs in Punjab present a significant puzzle as their religious principles were based on the 
equality of men and women. 
 
V. On the Origins of Kinship Systems in India 
  Why did kinship and inheritance systems differ across the regions in India? Most scholars 
believe that the origin and the spread of the northern kinship system can be traced to the 
historical path of the Indo-Aryan conquest. When the indigenous Indus civilization disintegrated 
around 1500BC, Aryans started migrating into northwestern India and brought with them new 
                                                 
31 In contrast to the relatively egalitarian relationships among the lowest castes, for the southern Brahmins “the 
father was superordinate to the son, the elder brother to the younger brother, the husband to the wife ... (Kolenda 
(1987)). In addition, the rates of close kin marriages among the Brahmans seem to be lower than those of other 
castes (Mandelbaum (1970, p.70), Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1984)). 
  25technologies of agriculture as well as military and political organization. However, the diffusion 
of Indo-Aryan civilization in India did not arise in one “natural state” but many different natural 
states as the Aryans adapted to different local geographic, economic and political factors. The 
variations in the relationships between the political and economic elites in different regions also 
led to variations in their family, kinship and inheritance institutions. 
  In the northwestern Indo-Gangetic plain, the Aryans developed a stable, decentralized, 
lineage-based, political, and kinship system which survived for centuries. Yet, as the Aryans 
marched to the eastern Bengal frontier, their political and kinship institutions were modified to 
form a more centralized state bureaucracy. The royal political elites formed alliances with local 
Brahmans who in turn formed alliances with local elites. However, in the South, the slow 
diffusion rather than the invasion of Aryans and their ideas created a distinctly different Aryan-
Dravidian society that was much more varied, localized and segmentary (Stein (1994)). In the 
South, the Aryans adopted the southern practice of cross-cousin marriages. This indigenous 
marriage system can be traced back as early as 62-106 AD among the Sātavāhana royal dynasty 
through the royal inscriptions (Trautman (1981)). 
  A: Political and Kinship Organization in Punjab 
  The Indo-Aryan culture arose in the Northern Gangetic plain where the monsoon rainfall 
was moderate and irrigated agriculture prior to British rule was limited. From a pastoral society 
that raised cattle, a mature settled agricultural society emerged in this region. The dominant form 
of agriculture was wheat and millet, but in places of sufficient water supply, rice was also 
cultivated. According to Thapar (1982), the rise of settled agriculture coincided with the rise of a 
kinship lineage society which was to last for centuries. By the medieval period, the local and 
regional political structure was based on the warrior Rajputs kinship clans and their networks. 
  26Each clan composed of its maximal lineages controlled a compact area of 12-84 villages.
32 Even 
when the territory was organized under the Mughal Empire, these Rajput clans retained 
significant control of their local territories. 
  Given the importance of the kinship clan as a political and economic institution in the 
North, its kinship system fostered the alliance of kin-networks over its maximal lineages. 
However, the kin political alliance system achieved stability by significantly reducing the 
bargaining power of women. At the clan level, marriages between the families of the same 
maximal lineage can threaten the political balance within the clan as these families can use 
marriage to build a more powerful political coalition. By requiring women to marry outside of 
her gotra or sapinda and by requiring her to marry outside of the villages of the maximal 
lineages, the northern system insured the political stability of the maximal clan lineage. At the 
level of the joint family, marriages also threatened the break-up of the family property since 
wives had an incentive to seek partition of joint property. By severely restricting the rights of 
women, the northern system limited the power of women to exercise her autonomy over her 
husband and her joint family.
33
  B: Political and Kinship Organization in Bengal 
  In the fifth and sixth centuries, the Indo-Aryan culture gradually marched eastward 
toward the Bengal jungle frontier. The Hindu Brahmans brought with them the technology of 
                                                 
32 Rajputs, Jats, Bhuinhar, and Ahir, were militarily and politically powerful at the regional and local level (Pradhan 
(1966) and Fox (1971)). At the apex of the caste hiearchy was the rajput raja or jat chaudhry who was the head of an 
extended territory. For the jats, each clan, composed of a maximal lineage, thok, controlled a compact area of 12-84 
villages known as khap (Pradhan (1966)). In an era of a weak centralized state, property rights of any individual 
warrior caste member depended greatly on the strength of his kin-group both as protection from outsiders and to 
control lower castes villagers who provided labor and services for the exploitation of land. 
33 The role of women in the break-up of the joint family property is a common theme in Indian literature. 
Mandelbaum (1970, p.103) writes: “Village exogamy seems to be an outcome not only of a special need for filial-
fraternal solidarity, but also of special fear for the fragility of those bonds. The wives in a family and their natal 
kinsmen are apparently perceived as potential sources of family disruption. Hence the wives should be isolated from 
their original kin which also means that their husbands, in their role as brothers, are equally isolated from their own 
beloved sisters.” Also see Mathur (2007). 
  27settled agriculture, but due to the abundance of rainfall, the new Bengalis adopted wet rice 
agriculture. Unlike the pastoral, wheat and barley agriculture of the Indo-Gangetic plain in 
Punjab, wet rice agriculture was intensive in capital and labor as it involved building and 
maintaining tanks and irrigation channels, planting, transplanting, monitoring of water levels, 
and harvesting. While wet rice agriculture was probably associated with a significant increase in 
productivity, it was also much more risky as few other crops could be grown in submerged 
water. As a result, the lives of villagers were more likely to be tied to the fortunes of the annual 
rice crop. 
  The regional political structure which emerged in Bengal differed in important respects 
from Punjab. In Bengal, the imperial state seems to have achieved significant level of 
centralization. Thus, unlike in Punjab, a warrior Kshatriya kin-group did not emerge as a 
regionally dominant military and political force. Instead, the level of centralization by the 
imperial state seems to have been achieved by building alliances with Brahmans and other 
dominant castes who were granted land and protection for tribute and taxes. The Brahmans, in 
turn, formed local alliances with other dominant Sudra castes to strengthen their local power. 
Thus, individual Brahmans were able to acquire large territories through the imperial and local 
alliance. 
  In Bengal, the northern kinship system was modified. Since the political stability of the 
maximal lineage was not important, evidence suggests that the gotra or the sapinda rule and the 
rule of village exogamy were not enforced in Bengal. In addition, as noted in section II, the 
inheritance rule was modified in Bengal from the rights of equal division of property by sons at 
birth to rights of the father to divide property at his death. Given that the patriarchal father had 
significant rights over his property, marriages did not threaten the devolution of family property. 
  28Thus, in Bengal, there were fewer benefits from suppressing the autonomy of women. In 
addition, Bengal was much more diverse in terms of ethnic groups as evidenced by the greater 
numbers of language and castes as compared to Punjab. The greater indigenous cultural diversity 
may also have mitigated a stricter enforcement of a uniform kinship system in Bengal. 
C: Political and Kinship Organization in Madras 
  In the South, the mountainous track which runs from east to west along the Tropic of 
Cancer impeded the march of the Indo-Aryan culture to its region. Despite the various military 
excursions from the North, the northern Indo-Aryan culture diffused slowly throughout the 
Dravidian South by slow absorption rather than by conquest. In the fertile irrigated river valleys, 
several major kingdoms – Pallavas, Cholas and Pandyas – achieved centralized tributary states 
whereas in the less fertile drier areas, they were ruled by numerous minor kingdoms and 
chiefdoms controlled by dominant land-holding groups (Stein (1981, 1998), Ludden (1985), 
Dirks (1993)). In the fertile regions, local elites such as the Vellalas granted villages to 
Brahmans (brahmadeya) and adopted the Sanskritic traditions.  
  According to Stein (1994), the political organization in the South was much more 
localized and segmentary due to its geography. However, there were no warrior, Kshatriya 
lineage-based territories in the South. Instead, territorial integrity was based on alliances between 
kings, local chiefs and dominant land-owning castes. For tribute and military alliance with the 
king, local chiefs and villagers received protection. At the village level, the higher land-owning 
castes built alliances with dominant Sudra castes such as the vallala to control the lower caste 
laborers, artisans and service workers. 
  29  In the South, the kinship system diverged significantly from that of the North.
34 Even for 
the Brahmans who migrated from the North, the preferred marriage arrangement was between 
cross-cousins which were not allowed by traditional Hindu law. Stein (1994) argues that the 
adoption of cross-cousin marriages was consistent with the widespread existence of political and 
social localism caused by the South’s segmentary political organization. Because wet rice 
agriculture in the South required the development of extensive irrigation works and the close 
working cooperation of the landholding group, cross-cousin marriages may have increased the 
efficiency of the agriculture in Madras.
35
  More importantly, Trautman (1981) suggests that the main reason for adopting the 
Dravidian kinship system in the South was for the royal lineages to preserve their localized 
hereditary kingships. Unlike the northern Indo-Aryan marriage rule of exogamy, the Dravidian 
cross-cousin marriage system allowed the formation of strong family alliances which lasted over 
time. As evidence for his hypothesis that kinship systems in the South were servants of the 
political elites, Trautman shows how the Dravidian cross-cousin marriage system was altered in 
                                                 
34 In South Kerala, the political and kinship systems differed significantly from the rest of Madras (Gough (1961)). 
The land in each village was owned by either a chieftain of the Raja, the royal lineage itself, a Brahman-managed 
temple, or a Nambudiri Brahman family. The indigenous Nayars, however, held hereditary rights of long-term 
tenure called kanam from the landlord and leased the land to Tiyyars or farmed the land using lower caste serfs who 
were attached to Nayar lineages. Unlike the rest of the South India, the Nayar men formed a military caste who 
served the royals. Because the Nayar men were often away from their homes and villages for extended periods, the 
Nayar women formed the nucleus of the land-holding group. For the Nambudiri Brahmans, their kinship system was 
patrilineal, patrilocal and through their marriage rule practiced primogeniture (Gough (1961), Mencher and 
Goldberg (1967)). Only the eldest son was allowed to marry with other Nambudiri Brahmans and inherit family 
property; the younger sons married Nayars and had no rights to family property or its lineage. For the Nayars, 
however, their kinship was matrilineal and duolocal. The hereditary kanam rights to land was inherited through the 
female line. For Mencher (1966), the Brahman-Nayar political alliance and local geography explain the rise of 
Nayar’s matrilineal system. Since Nayar boys were recruited and trained as soldiers and left their natal homes at 
early ages, only Nayar women provided local continuity. However, Mencher argues that geographic factors were 
also very important. In South Kerala, where rainfall was abundant and reliable and where its lateritic soil absorbed 
moisture rapidly, there was no need for cooperation between families for agriculture. Thus, the villages and 
settlements were dispersed rather than nucleated. 
 
35 For the Kallars in Pudkkottai, Dirks (1993, p.206) writes that lineages within a natu, which averaged between 
twelve and eighteen villages, were not allowed to marry lineages outside of their natu. Thus, the rule of natu 
endogamy as well as cross-cousin marriages contributed to stable lineage-based territorial subdivisions. 
  30Kerala and Sri Lanka to serve the local political elites. In Kerala, where the prevalent kinship 
system was matrilineal, the royal rule of succession became matrilateral rather than patrilateral; 
in Sri Lanka, however, the marriage of patrilateral parallel cousins was consistent with a lateral – 
brother-to-brother – royal succession. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  The institutions of family and kinship ordered the lives of individuals in pre-modern 
societies as they defined the social rules of society. These informal institutions specified the rules 
of behavior as well as rights to inheritance and property and reduced the uncertainties in human 
interactions (North (1981, 2005)). These informal institutions, however, did not operate in a 
political vacuum. While the causal linkages between politics and kinship are poorly understood, 
there are reasons to believe that the two are inextricably linked. Moreover, just as many modern 
formal institutions originated as instruments to govern society for the benefit of political elites, 
the informal kinship institutions were also likely to have served similar functions for political 
elites in traditional societies. 
  In this paper, we find considerable evidence that the family and kinship institutions 
significantly influenced gender relationships in society. The northern Indo-Aryan kinship system 
seems to have fostered the “son preference” of families and significantly reduced the female 
population through selective neglect. In northeastern Bengal, where the kinship and inheritance 
system diverged somewhat, the sex ratio was slightly improved. However, the southern 
Dravidian kinship system based on the acceptance of close kin marriages seems to have fostered 
relative gender equality. Thus, we find that sex ratio in southern Madras actually favored females 
  31at the turn of the twentieth century. In addition, northern Indo-Aryan speaking societies and 
Hindus as compared to Muslims seem to exhibit “son preference.” 
  In addition, we also argue that it is extremely important to investigate sex ratios by caste 
in India. Because castes were endogamous, sex ratios by caste are likely to capture variations in 
kinship behavior by different caste groups. Our data on sex ratios by castes exhibit a remarkably 
stable pattern across all the regions. In each region, “son preference” inferred from sex ratios was 
positively correlated with caste rank. Even in southern Madras, the higher landowning and 
religious castes possessed significantly lower sex ratios than the lower artisan and service castes.  
  The fact that most societies adopt one kinship system suggests there are social economies 
to a uniform informal rule of behavior. However, just as many formal institutions favor political 
elites at the expense of general population, the informal kinship systems may also have 
significant distributional consequences. To the extent that the kinship rules favored the higher 
caste elites in each region, the adoption of one kinship system may have reduced the welfare of 
low castes in each region. Relative to their optimal kinship rule, the low castes may have too few 
women in the North and to many women in the South. In the North, the low castes may have 
forgone the benefits of economically productive women whereas in the South a cross-cousin 
marriage system may have increased the genetic costs without providing much alliance 
benefits.
36
  Despite the fact that the family and kinship systems arose in ancient India, these 
institutions continue to influence the lives of modern Indians. Even as the economic value of 
women has risen over time with the growing importance of education as well as employment 
opportunities in manufacturing and services, the traditional family and kinship institutions have 
contributed to a growing “son” rather than “daughter” preference in Indian society. 
                                                 
36 See Bittle (2002) for evidence on the link between consanguinity, genetic disorders and morbidity in India. 
  32Unfortunately, modernization and the introduction of formal western institutions seem to have 
reduced the importance of the southern indigenous kinship system and introduced the emergence 
of “son preference” even in southern India. Thus, a better understanding of the causes of the 
persistence northern kinship system is likely to provide insights on how to foster greater gender 



















                                                 
37 Greif (2006) and Carsten (1996) provide insights as to why informal institutions based on personalized 
exchanges may persist even when they become inefficient. Also see Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005). 
  33           Figure 1 
 
Note: Uw denotes utility of wife and Uh denotes utility of husband. Tw
 and Th
 are the respective threat points of the 
wive and the husband.  
 
 
    T a b l e   1  
 
      Kinship and Bargaining Power of Women 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Patrilineal Negative    North 
Patrilocal Negative    North,  South 
Matrilneal  Positive    South  (Kerala) 
Matrilocal  Positive     
Duolocal  Positive    South  (Kerala) 
 
Close-Kin  Positive    South,  Muslims 
Exogamy Negative    North 
   Gotra/Sapinda  Very Negative    North, Brahmins/High Caste 
Joint Families  Negative    Land Owning Castes 
Arranged marriage  Negative    India 
Low age at marriage  Negative    India, East 
 
Inheritance 
 Mitakshara Negative    North 
 Dayabhaga Slightly  Negative  East 
 Dowry  Possibly Negative  North, High Caste 
 Bride price  Positive     South, Low Caste 
 Women’s right to 
   Property  Positive     South 
 
No Divorce  Negative    High Caste 
No Market Labor  Negative    High Caste 
Behavioral Restrictions  Negative    High Caste 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  34  Fig 2 : Sex Ratio distribution across provinces of India, 1901                     
 
  35  Fig 3 : Sex Ratio distribution across districts within the study area, 1901                     
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Note: Sex ratio distribution across the different caste categories for the pooled data set with all provinces.   
 











































































































  37     T a b l e   2  
 
      Descriptive Statistics: Punjab, Bengal and Madras, 1901 
 
 




Total  Population    24,754,737   78,493,410   38,623,066 
Area  (sq  mile)    150,207    189,837    143,221 
Density     179.0    413.5    269.7 
Total  Hindu    10,344,333   49,687,362   34,436,586 
Total  Muslim    12,159,394   25,495,416   2,477,610 
Total  Sikh    2130987    -    - 
Total  Christian    -    278366    1038854 
Proportion  Hindu    0.42    0.63    0.89 
Proportion  Muslim   0.49    0.33    0.064 
Proportion  Sikh    0.09    -    - 
Proportion  Christian   -    0.004    0.061   
Female     11,402,223   39,215,224   19,584,070 
Male     13,352,514   39,215,224   19,038,996 
Sex  Ratio  (female/male)   0.854    0.981    1.029 
Total  Number  of  Castes   121    380    321 
Total  Number  of  Languages  24    45    75   
Total Number of Villages
+   32,663    203,476    54,065 




D i s t r i c t s      2 9     5 3     2 5  
Population         485,387    1,494,215   1,379,395 
Number  of  Castes       47    78    65 
Number  of  Languages        5.5    8.5    7.5 
 
Note: The figures for Punjab include Northwest Frontier Provinces 





















  38     T a b l e   3  
 
    Descriptive Statistics: Sex Ratio by Caste and Province, 1901 
     M e a n   ( S D )  
 
   P u n j a b     B e n g a l     M a d r a s    A l l  
 
Religious   0.822    0.975    1.004   0.947 
Landowner   0.844    0.920    1.02   0.937 
Cultivator   0.847    0.990    1.044   0.963 
Professional   0.883    0.995    1.019   0.969 
Trader    0.863    0.958    1.008   0.960 
Artisans      0.904    0.994    1.046   0.987 
Agri  Labor   0.868    1.006    1.011   0.960 
Service    0.873    1.034    1.123   1.026 
Tribal    0.893    0.942    0.991   0.945 
Other       1.011    1.034   1.021 
Unknown   0.853    1.042    0.933   1.022 
         
Total    0.869    0.991    1.027   0.977 
 
Note: Sex ratio is defined as female divided by male total population. To eliminate outliers, we dropped 






     T a b l e   4  
 
    Descriptive Statistics: Sex Ratios by Religion, 1901 
      
   
  Punjab   Bengal   Madras   All 
 
Hindu   0.845   1.005   1.029   0.976 
Muslim   0.877   0.983   1.031   0.982 
Sikh    0.770         -                          -                          0.770    
Christian  -                         0.946    1.033    1.014  
Total   0.854   0.998   1.028   0.977 
 















  39                        Table 5 
 
      Descriptive Statistics; Sex Ratios by Language, 1901 
     M e a n    
 
Language   Punjab   Bengal   Madras   Total
Aryan  (Central)   0.715   0.791   0.941   0.797 
Aryan  (North)   0.770   -   0.943   0.786 
Hilly  (North)   0.861   -   -   0.861 
Tribal  (North)   0.827   -   -   0.827 
Malyalese   -   -   0.792   0.792 
Aryan  (East)   0.705   0.952   1.009   0.950 
Aryan  (South)   -   0.815   0.958   0.952 
Tamil    -   0.661   0.956   0.943 
Telegu    -   0.857   0.994   0.970 
Canarese  -   -   0.975   0.975 
Dravid  (Other)   -   0.933   0.973   0.969 
Munda    -   1.058   0.985   1.049   
Hilly  (East)   -   0.915   -   0.915 
Tribal  (East)   -   0.952   -   0.952 
Tribal  (South)   -   -   0.930   0.930 
Tibetan    -   0.912   -   0.912 
Foreign    0.875   0.982   -   0.922 
Unknown   0.719   0.962   1.017   0.814 
 
Note: Sex ratio is defined as female divided by male total population. In the Census of 1901, 122 distinct languages 
were identified in the 3 provinces of Punjab, Madras and Bengal.  As shown in the Appendix, these languages were 





























  40                        Table 6A 
 
           Sex Ratios by Caste, 1901 
 
    P u n j a b     B e n g a l     M a d r a s  
 
Religious    -0.082***   -0.02    -0.043** 
    (0.014)    (0.018)    (0.017)    
             
Landowner    -0.060***   -0.075***   -0.027* 
    (0.011)    (0.016)    (0.014) 
 
Cultivator    -0.056***   -0.002    -0.003 
    (0.015)    (0.014)    (0.036) 
             
Trader     -0.041**        -0.037*                -0.039** 
    ( 0 . 0 1 7 )            ( 0 . 0 1 5 )     ( 0 . 0 1 7 )  
          
Professional    -0.021        0.001    -0.028 
    (0.017)           (0.021)    (0.027) 
 
Agri    Labor    -0.036**          0.012    -0.035 
    ( 0 . 0 1 4 )         ( 0 . 0 1 8 )       ( 0 . 0 2 7 )  
          
Service     -0.031          0.040**     0.076*** 
    ( 0 . 0 2 )         ( 0 . 0 1 8 )       ( 0 . 0 2 4 )  
          
Tribal     -0.011        -0.052***     -0.056** 
    ( 0 . 0 2 2 )         ( 0 . 0 1 9 )         ( 0 . 0 2 4 )  
          
Other     -          0.017        -0.012 
           ( 0 . 0 1 4 )         ( 0 . 0 1 5 )  
          
Constant     0.904***          0.994***       1.046*** 
                  (0.007)          (0.007)      (0.009) 
District    
Fixed-effects       no           no            no 
R-squared    0.042            0.014            0.021 
Observations              1117          3187          1410 
 
Note: Artisan is the omitted category. Sex ratio is defined as female divided by male total population. To eliminate 
outliers, we dropped observations if sex ratio was greater than 3 or less than 0.3 and if caste population was less than 
300. We also excluded data on castes for whose occupation could not be identified. *** significant at the 1% level; 
** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 












  41    T a b l e   6 B  
 
              Sex Ratios by Caste: All Districts 
 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)      
 
Religious  -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.043***      
  (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.010)    
 
Landowner  -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.053***      
  (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.008)    
  
Cultivator  -0.022**   -0.013   -0.020**    
  (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.010)    
 
Trader   -0.027**   -0.0392***    -0.042***     
  (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.009)    
 
Professional  -0.018   -0.009   -0.004    
  (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.013)    
 
Agri  Labor  -0.027**   -0.007   0.003     
  (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.011)    
 
Service   0.039*** 0.035*** 0.021*    
  (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.012)    
 
Tribal    -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.025*     
  (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.012)    
 
Punjab   -   -0.161***  -     
    ( 0 . 0 0 8 )     
 
Bengal   -   -0.051***  -   
    ( 0 . 0 0 6 )  
 
Population (log)    -                -    0.005***    
      ( 0 . 0 0 1 )      
     
Constant   0.987*** 1.049*** 0.852***    
  (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.007)     
District 
Fixed-effects  yes   yes   yes       
R-squared  0.016   0.076   0.220       
Observations  5714   5714   5714     
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Artisan is the omitted category. Madras is the omitted province. Sex-ratio is defined as female divided by 
male total population. To eliminate outliers, we dropped observations if sex ratio was greater than 3 or less than 0.3 
and if caste population was less than 300. We also excluded data on castes for whose occupation could not be 
identified. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 






  42      T a b l e   7  
 
           Sex Ratios by Religion, Province and Caste 
 
 
  Punjab   Bengal   Madras   All            Hindu Muslim 
 
Muslim    0.041***  0.053***  0.001    0.044***       -                - 
    (0.008)    (0.012)    (0.020)    (0.007)                            
 
Religious  -0.078***  -0.026    -0.041**    -0.044***    -0.045***  -0.032 
  (0.014)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.010)                (0.011)  (0.020) 
 
Landowner  -0.067*** -0.062*** -0.028**    -0.049***     -0.053***  -0.024 
    (0.011)    (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.008)          (0.009)  (0.018) 
 
Cultivator  -0.048***  -0.004    -0.019    -0.015         -0.017  -0.012 
    (0.015)    (0.013)    (0.034)    (0.010)          (0.010)  (0.028) 
 
Trader   -0.031*   -0.037**   -0.036**   -0.038***            -0.043***  0.032 
    (0.016)    (0.014)    (0.016)    (0.009)           (0.010)  (0.037) 
 
Professional  -0.025    0.020    -0.024    -0.0009          -0.0007  0.007 
  (0.017)   (0.020)   (0.026)   (0.013)           (0.014)  (0.031) 
 
Agri Labor  -0.023*    0.033**   -0.035    0.008           0.010  -0.002 
  (0.013)   (0.016)   (0.027)   (0.011)           (0.011)  (0.038) 
 
Service    -0.026    0.009    0.074***  0.018            0.020  0.011 
  (0.020)   (0.017)   (0.024)   (0.012)           (0.014)  (0.022) 
 
Tribal    0.005    -0.013    -0.045*    -0.019            -0.021  0.074 
    (0.021)    (0.018)    (0.024)    (0.012)            (0.013)  (0.102) 
 
Constant    0.886***  0.984***  1.046***  0.980***         0.984***   0.981*** 
    (0.008)    (0.006)    (0.009)    (0.004)            (0.005)  (0.009) 
District 
Fixed-effects  yes    yes                         yes       yes      yes        yes 
Obs    1117    2875    1177      5169             4345     824 
R-square  0.14    0.2    0.12      0.22              0.23     0.39 
 
Note: Hindu is the omitted religion category; artisan is the omitted caste category. Sex ratio is defined as female 
divided by male total population. To eliminate outliers, we dropped observations if sex ratio was greater than 3 or 
less than 0.3 and if caste population was less than 300. We also excluded data on castes for whose occupation could 














  43                      Table 8A 
    Sex Ratios by Language with District-Fixed Effects 
     
 
    ( 1 )     ( 2 )    
    
Aryan  (Central)      -0.155***   -0.171***   
    (0.0364)    (0.043) 
Aryan  (North)    -0.132***   -0.182***   
    ( 0 . 0 3 9 )     ( 0 . 0 4 4 )  
Hilly  (North)    -0.113    -0.108 
    ( 0 . 0 7 7 )     ( 0 . 0 6 6 )  
Tribal  (North)    -0.101    -0.142 
    ( 0 . 2 0 6 )     ( 0 . 1 5 2 )  
Munda     0.149***  0.081 
    ( 0 . 0 4 9 )     ( 0 . 0 4 9 )  
Aryan  (South)    0.089    -0.017 
    ( 0 . 0 6 3 )     ( 0 . 0 5 7 )  
M a l a y a l e s e        - 0 . 1 7 7 *  
       ( . 1 0 1 )  
Canarese      0.006 
       ( 0 . 0 6 2 )  
T a m i l         - 0 . 0 2 5  
       ( 0 . 0 5 8 )  
Telegu        0.001 
       ( 0 . 0 5 3 )  
Aryan  (East)    -0.041    -0.019 
    ( 0 . 0 4 3 )     ( 0 . 0 4 7 )  
Hilly  (East)    0.046    -0.054 
    ( 0 . 0 6 8 )     ( 0 . 0 5 9 )  
Tribal  (East)    0.024    -0.017 
    ( 0 . 0 4 3 )     ( 0 . 0 4 6 )  
Tribal  (South)    0.048    -0.038 
    ( 0 . 1 2 1 )     ( 0 . 0 9 3 )  
Tibetan     0.057    -0.056 
    ( 0 . 1 1 3 )     ( 0 . 0 8 8 )  
Foreign     -0.298***   -0.046 
    ( 0 . 0 7 7 )     ( 0 . 0 8 0 )  
Population  (log)    0.033***   
    ( 0 . 0 0 4 )     
Constant     0.594***  0.969***   
    ( 0 . 0 5 6 )     ( 0 . 0 4 0 )  
R-squared    0.160    0.156 
Observations      668    631 
 
Note: Dravidian (southern) is the omitted category. Sex ratio is defined as female divided by male total population. 
In the Census of 1901, 122 number of distinct languages were identified.  As shown in the Appendix, these 
languages were grouped into categories shown above. To eliminate outliers, we dropped observations if sex ratio 
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   Table 8B 
 
Sex Ratio by regional Language groups (Neighboring Districts of North India) 
 
 
   (1)    (2) 
 
Hilly    0.286***  0.266*** 
   (0.071)    (0.071) 
 
Hindustani   0.170***  0.176*** 
   (0.061)    (0.064) 
 
Kashmiri  -0.065    -0.089 
   (0.083)    (0.083) 
 
Western    0.233***  0.191** 
   (0.074)    (0.077) 
 
Punjab    -    -0.143** 
      ( 0 . 0 7 0 )  
 
R a j p u t a n a    -     - 0 . 0 7 0  
      ( 0 . 0 9 2 )  
 
United  Provinces   -    -0.148 
      ( 0 . 0 9 7 )  
 
Constant    0.647***  0.77*** 
   (0.049)    (0.081) 
 
R  square    0.278    0.298 
Obs    66    66 
 
Note:  Western language group comprise different Gujrati and Rajasthani languages. 
 
 
              Table 9 
   Sex Ratio by Type of Agriculture 
 
Dependent Variable: Sex Ratio  
 
Wheat    -0.385*** 
   (0.058) 
 
Rice    -0.032 
   (0.034) 
 
Constant    1.036 
   (0.019) 
 
R-square  0.029 
Obs    4241 
 
Note: Wheat and rice denote the fraction of cropped area under these respective crops.       
  45      Table 10           
     
              Sex Ratios by Caste and Geography 
 
 
          (1)          (2)          (3)     (4) 
 
Rainfall     -0.000019***   -0.000048***        -0.000021***  -0.00005** 
      (0.000004)   (0.000004)   (0.000005)  (0.00002) 
 
Alluvial      -0.057**    -0.025    -0.051**   -0.017 
      (0.018)      (0.022)      (0.022)     (0.021) 
 
Black       0.034      0.012    -0.055   -0.0001 
      (0.012)                 (0.013)      (0.033)    (0.037) 
 
Red       0.031    -0.008      -0.014     -0.009 
      (0.007)      (0.007)      (0.025)     (0.021) 
  
Coast       0.038    -0.008      -0.020     -0.013 
      (0.008)      (0.008)      (0.028)       (0.028) 
 
British 
Rule           -0.0009     -0.0005 
            ( 0 . 0 0 0 6 )       ( 0 . 0 0 0 9 )  
 
Punjab        -0.141***           -0.166*** 
         ( 0 . 0 1 2 )                  ( 0 . 0 4 7 )  
 
Bengal          0.018                 0.031 
         ( 0 . 0 3 0 )                    ( 0 . 0 3 5 )  
 
Constant     1.026***      1.09***      1.156***     1.156*** 
     (0.010)       (0.011)        (0.026)     (0.123) 
Cluster 
by District    yes          yes            yes         yes 
Adj R-square   0.0384         0.08           0.07         0.07 
Obs     4958         4958           4684        4684 
 
Note: Madras is the omitted province. Sex ratio is defined as female divided by male total population. To eliminate 
outliers, we dropped observations if sex ratio was greater than 3 or less than 0.3 and if caste population was less than 















  46Appendix I: Definitions of Castes by Occupation 
 
Occupations of castes were defined using the censuses and various ethnographic studies of India: Ibbetson (1916) 
for Punjab, Risley (1892) for Bengal, and Thurston (1909) for Madras. 
 
Castes of Punjab: 
 
Agricultural labor: chamar, chuhra, dhanak, jhinwar, khatik, mus_chuhra, mus_jhinwar, mus_machhi, bawaria, 
changar 
Artisan: basketmaker(dumna), blacksmith (lohar, mus_lohar), carpenter (mus_tarkhan, tarkhan), 
leather (jaiswara, kori, mus_mochi), mason (barwala), metal worker (mus_sunar, sunar), 
other/labor (mazbi, mus_jhabel, batwal, chanal, dagi, garri, ghai, kalal, mus_kalal, mus_kanchan, 
mus_lilahi, mus_penja, mus_qassab, mus_rangrez, mus_teli, nungar, sarera), potter (kumhar, 
mus_kumhar), tailor(darzi, mus_darzi), village watchmen(mina),  weaver (gadaria, julaha, meg, 
mus_julaha) 
Cultivator:  ahir, chang, gaddi, ghirath, ghosi, kachhi, kamboh, kanet, lodha, mus_kamboh, mus_mallah, 
pun_mali, reia, saini, gakkhar, khattar, taga 
Landowner:  bodla, gujjar, jat, karral, kharral, mahtam, mus_awan, mus_biloch, mus_dogar, mus_gujar, 
mus_jat, mus_khokhar, mus_meo, mus_pachhada, mus_pun_pathan, mus_pun_rajput, 
mus_qureshi, mus_rawat, mus_shekh, pun_rajput, rathi, ror 
Religious:    mus_faqir, mus_pun_jogi, pun_jogi, bishnoi, faqir, mus_sayad, pun_brahman 
Professional:  kaiath, mirasi, mus_khoja, mus_mirasi, mus_nai, nai 
Service:   washermen (chimba, dhobi) 
Trader:    banjara, bhabra, bohra, khattri, labana, mus_kunjra, mus_maniar, naik, nat, pahari_mahajan, sud 
Tribe:      agari, aheri, bazigar, mus_beldar, mus_harni, od, sansi 
Unknown:    gurkha, mus_kashmiri, mus_pun_moghal, sirkiband 
 
 
Castes of Bengal: 
 
Agricultural labor: banwar, bauri, dhunia, doai, gangauta, hari, kadar, kaora, kotal, musahar, nagar,  nagesia, 
nagesia_ani, naiya, namasudra, oraon, oraon_ani, pargha, rajwar, sair, savar 
Artisan: basketmaker  (baiti, bantar, bari, dalu, dhamin, dhanua, karanga, majwar_ani, panpanika, 
patial_patikar, patni, rajbansi_total, turi_ani, turi, dafadar), blacksmith (kamar_lohar, 
kami,marya),carpenter (barhi, kharadi, sutradhar, kharadi_mus), goldsmith  (sonar, mir, 
sonar_mus), leather (chamar, muchi, sarki, muchi_mus), mason (kandu, barhi_mus, datiya, 
thawai), metal worker (kansari, thathera, kalaigar) other (bedea, bediya, bhaskar, dosadh, ghasi, 
gorait, halalkhor, halwai, jhora, kalu, laheri, mahuria, malakar, niyari, nuniya, nuri, palwar, patwa, 
sankhari, sinduria, sokiar, sunrishaha, teli_total, tiklihar, abdal, atashbaz, bediya_mus, besati, 
bhanr, bhatiya_mus, chik, dhari_mus), potter (kharura, kumhar, mehtar, chunari, kumhar_mus), 
tailor (damai, darzi, darzi_mus, nagarchi), weaver (bagdi, gareri, jogi_jugi, kapali, karni, patra, 
tanti, chhipigar, dafali, jolaha, patwa_mus),  
Cultivator:  agaria, atith, atith_ani, bhar, bhat, bhogta_ani, bhogta, chain, chakma, chasi, dhanuk, dhimal, 
ghani, gonrhi, kahar, kaibartta_total, kaur, kewat, khandait, khatik, khatwe, khawas, kora, koshta, 
magh, magh_buddhist, mal, malpaharia, malpaharia_ani, markande, mech, mech_ani, naik, pasi, 
pod, pundaripuro, rajbhar, rarhi, sukli, telaga, turaha, yakha, bhat_mus, dewan, kulu  
Landowner:  aguri,  ahirgoala, ahir_gaura, babhan, bandawat, barui, kachari, kalita, kapuria, kastha, khaira, 
khambu, kharia, kharwar, khatia, kuki, kurmi, kurmi_ani, mahar, manjhi, rajput, rautia, sadgop, 
sarak, sunuwar, surajbansi, tamaria, ashraf, chaudhuri 
Other: fishermen  (banpar, berua, lohaitkuri, mallah, malo, muriyari, naliya, tiyar, mallah_mus, 
naliya_mus), other (besya, deohar, gandharb, kathak, khelta, pawaria, surahiya, telinga, dai, fakir, 
hijra, khanjar, madaria, nikhari, pawaria_mus, sardar, amat, arakh, nabya, aghori), labor (ajlaf, 
agri, bahelia, behara, beldar, bhuinmali, dhimar, dom, gharti, kan, lalbegi, murmi, murmi_bud, 
sudha, sudra, thami, behara_mus, beldar_mus, dhawa, golam, lalbegi_mus, mali, mandal, 
masalchi, mehtar_mus, sikalgar)  
Professional:  baidya, ghatwal, kachra, karan, kayastha, rajbhat, sahar, subarnabanik, vaisya 
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Religious:  aoghar, arya, banjara, brahman_hindu, brahman_agradani, brahman_barna, brahman_daibajan, 
brahman_nepali, dasnami, gaur, gosain, jagwa, jyotish, kabirpanthi, khandelwal, samanta, 
sannyasi, seo_narayani, taula, thakuri, kazi, khwandkar, saiad 
Service:               barber (bhandari, gola, hajjam, napit, bhagawani, hajjam_mus, khan, nau_muslim),  washermen 
(dhoba, dhobi), music and dance (bhatiya, dhari, gain, kawali, nat, bakho, bhathiara, 
halalkhor_mus, miriasin, nat_mus) 
Trader:  naik_mus, adarki, agaria_ani, agarwala, agarwala_jain, agrahari, asur, bais_baniya, banaudhia, 
baniya, barnawar, bhakat, gandhabanik, ganrar, gujar, guria, kacharu, kalwar, kasarwani, 
kathbania, khatri, khen, madhunapit, mahesri, mahuri, marwari, mayra, nichondia, oswal, 
oswal_jain, rastogi, rauniar, sadhu, saraogi, saraogi_ani, tambuli, bakali, banjara_mus  
Tribe:  lodha, toto_ani, bathudi, bhotia, bhotia_buddhist, birhor, garo, gond, gulgulia, gurung, ho, juang, 
kandh, kandh_ani, kanjar, korwa, korwa_ani, lepcha, limbu, mahli, mahli_ani, malar, malesauria, 
malesauria_ani, mangar, maulik, munda, munda_ani, murung, parhaiya, santal, santal_ani, tharu, 
tipara 
Unknown:  ajnasi, baghuti, baishnab, balija, banjogi, baola, bhoi, dariadasi, datia, dogara, ghantra, ghusuria, 
girgiria, godra, gokha, gonr, guni, gurer, hadi, hajang, hayu, irika, jadupetia, kachhi, kadma, 
kahalia, kallar, kaltuya, kandra, kantabudiya, kartta, kasaundhan, kela, khami, khas, kheturi, 
khitibansa, khoiri, khyang, kichar, koli, konal, kukihalam, kumuti, kurariar, lushei, malhar, 
morangia, nahura, nekua, pahira, pankhu, porawal_jain, raju, sabakhia, sanai, shagird, shamri, 
siamese, sikh_sikh, sinhalese, sitaliyasiyal, siyalgir, surbhang, thoria, tulabhina, ujia, ajat, akhundi, 
bhisti, chaklai ,chamba ,chatua ,ghazi ,habshi ,jadupetia_mus, kalandar, kasbi ,khoja ,mahifarosh 
mahimal ,mallik_mus ,mangta ,mehana ,mirdah, mirza ,miyan ,moghal ,nalband ,nanbai ,sabangar 
,shah ,shekh ,thakrai, tikulihar ,tutia,assamese, barnasankar, bengali, bhuiya, brahmo, buddhist, 
burmese, dhenuar, gangai, guzrati, jain, japanese, madrasi, manipuri, maratha, nanakshahi, nepali, 
newar, newar_bud, oriya, sikh, tibetian, afghan, afridi, biloch, kashmiri, manipuri_muslim, 
musalman, pathan, shiah, sunni 
 
Castes of Madras: 
 
Agricultural Labor: cheruman, holeya, mala, malasar, muppan, pallan, paniyan, valayian, vedan 
Artisans:  basketmaker (bavuri, bellara, gudala, katasan, kichagara, medara, nalakeyava, savara), 
blacksmith (badhyoi, muli), carpenter (chaptegara, charodi), domestic servant (muvvard, 
sudra), drummer (haddi, relli), leather (chakkiliyan, godari, jaggali, madiga, muchhi, samagara, 
semman, tolkollan), mason (eruman, kamsala, kolayan), oil presser (chakkan, gandla, ganiga, 
sappaliga, telli, vaniyan), other (ashtalohi, kaniyan, konsari, kattumahrati, pambaikkaran, 
valluvan, ghontora, katike, chemhotti, sayakkaran, nodha, sunnari, lohara, noliya, magura, 
chakkiliyan, tondaman, pulluvan, kuttadi, dudekula, tiyan, kadan, pothriya, kallan, kanisan, 
gudigara, kurumban, jetti, chandala, dammula, kota, meria, ori_ashtalohi, puliyan), potter 
(anduran, kumbara, kumbharo, kummara, kusavan, mal_anduran, mal_kammalan, somara, 
kuravan), tailor (mal_panan, panan ), village watchman (dandasi, mutracha), weaver (chaliyan, 
dombo, kaikolan, karnabattu, khatri, koliyan, kurni, kuruba, pano, patvegara, ronguni, tonti) 
Cultivator:    seppilivan, agaru, ambalakaran, arakala, bonka, gaudo, gayinta, khoira, kondadora, kottiya, 
kuluvan, malayali, mali, mudugar, odiya, panisavan, pombada, pondra, rona, tel_agaru, tel_arakala 
Landowner:  arasu, ballala, agamudaiyan, aiyarakam, alia, aruva, badaga, bant, bhatrazu, bhayipuo, bhumia, 
boda, bolasi, bosantiya, bottada, chinda, chuvano, devanga, dhakado, dhulia, doluva, gatti, gauda, 
gayara, heggade, ilamagan, kalingi, kamma, kamunchia, kappiliyan, kapu, khuduba, kolata, 
kshatriya, kudubi, kudumo, kunnavan, lingayat, majjulu, malaiman, malava, mattia, muriya, 
muttiriyan, nagaralu, nagavasulu, nattaman, nattan, navayat, omaito, ori_alia, ori_aruva, palli, 
patra, pentiya, poroja, rajput, sadar, sheik, sudarman, suddho, tel_aiyarakam, udaivan, vakkaliga, 
valuvadi, vellala 
Other:     fishermen (arayan, bagata, bestha, chuditiya, jalari, kabbera, karaiyan, kevuto, kharvi, kondra, 
kukkundi, mal_arayan, mappilla, mogar, mukkuvan, neyyala, nulayan, paravan, pattanavan, 
sembadavan, toreya), labor (bedaru, billava, gamalla, halepaik, idiga, iluvan, indra, karumpurattan, 
shanan, siolo, boya, kudiya, mal_vettuvan, paidi, pulaiyan, samantiya, sonkari, alavan, koraga, 
kotari, kuruman, parivaram, uppiliyan, urali), lower religious (ambalavasi, andi, boishnobo, dasari, 
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occhan, pandaram, pattapu, ravulo, sanjogi, sannasi), shepherd (gauli, golla, idaiyan), 
Religious:    brahman, can_brahman, elayad, mal_brahman, mussad, ori_brahman, other_brahman, pujari, 
saiyad, stanika, tel_brahman, can_brahman 
Professional:    kanakkan, kadupattan, kammalan, karnam, kotegara, mahanti, nise, panchala, pandito, 
patnulkaran, puluvan, samantan 
Service: barber (ambattan, bhandari, bhondari, kavutiyan, kelasi, mangala, melakkaran, velakkattalavan), 
dancing girl (dasi, guni, patramela), washermen (velan, agasa, agasu, dhobi, nekkara, vannan, 
veluttedan), 
Trader:    agarwala, anappan, arab, balija, banajiga, benia, bepari, bondili, bora, can_anappan, chetti, 
jonagan, kadukonkani, kannadiyan, kavandan, komati, labbai, lambadi, marakkayar, marvari, 
memon, muttan, panikkan, pathan, rajapuri, senaikkupaiyan, sondi, tarakan, vettuvan 
Tribe:      aranadan, chenchu, gadaba, hasala, irula, jatapu, karimpalan, kattunayakkan, khond, koyi, 
kuriochan, mal_aranadan, mannan, mellikalu, paliyan, solaga, yerravala 
Unknown:  godiya, arsan, dakni, gond, ite, kongan, konkani, moghal, musalman, nutar,  
saiva, sharif, tohala, vallamban 
 
 
Appendix II: Definitions of Language Categories 
 
Languages of Punjab: Central Indo-Aryan (hindustani, bikaneri, marwari, mewati, hindi), North Indo-Aryan 
(multani, bahawalpu, punjabi, dogri, bagri, gujari, ahirwati, hariani), East Indo-Aryan (bengali), Foreign (balochi, 
pashto), Pahari-North (pahari), Tribal-North (jangli), Other (??) 
 
Languages of Bengal: Central Indo-Aryan (hindi, marwari, mahli, gujrati, kachchhi), North Indo-Aryan 
(panjabi, sindhi, kashmiri), East Indo-Aryan (bangali, oriya, assamese), Dravidian (malto, malhar, telegu, tamil, 
canarese, malayalm), Foreign (singhalese, burmese, arakanese), Munda (agaria, asur, birjia, kharia, mundari, 
bhumij, turia, birhor, kora, korwa, singli), Pahari-East (toto, limbu, lepcha, dhimal, mumi, gurung, mangar, 
khambu, newar, thami, yakha, sunuwar), South Indo-Aryan (marathi, goanese), Tibetan (tibetian, sikkim_bhotia, 
sharpa_bhotia), Tribal-East (khas, gipsy, ho, santali, karmali, oraon, gondi, manjhi, hayu, mech, kachari, garo, 
tipara, koch, kuki, manipuri, banjogi, pankhu, khyang, khami, lushei, mru, khasi, hallam), Unknown (juang, kandh) 
 
Languages of Madras: Central Indo-Aryan (laria, hindostani, hindi, marwari, gujrati, kachchhi), North Indo-
Aryan (lambadi, punjabi, sindhi), East Indo-Aryan (bengali, oriya), South Indo-Aryan (konkani, marathi, 
goanese), Dravidian (khond, irula, kota, kurumba, korava, toda, tulu, kodagu, konda, koraga, canarese, malayalam, 
tamil, telegu), Foreign (mahl, burmese, parsi), Munda (gadaba, savara), Tribal-South (badaga, gondi, koya), 
Unknown (sanskrit, bellara, gattu, kasuva, patnuli, poroja, bastari, chatgaiya, others) 
 
 
Appendix III: Interpreting India’s Aggregate Population Sex Ratio 
 
  Due to data limitations, we construct sex ratios using aggregate population ratios of females to males. 
However, in this appendix, we argue that this figure is like to reflect “son or daughter” preference of Indian 
communities. Our analysis suggests that when male sex-bias arises, it is likely to arise in early years of childhood. 
But because adult mortality rates between the two sexes across the various regions are relatively stable over time, 
the aggregate population ratios continue to reflect the early childhood sex-bias. 
   In Figure A1, we present sex ratios by different age groups at the provincial level for the three provinces. 
While sex-ratios vary by age groups, except for one age-group (10-15) in Bengal, the overall pattern is very similar 
across the three regions. Sex ratio falls from 0-5 to 10-15 age cohorts and then rises for the next two cohorts (15-20, 
20-25), falls again for the next three cohorts (25-30, 30-35, 35-40), and then rises and falls again for the next two 
cohorts (40-45, 45-50). Importantly, the gap in sex ratios, especially for Punjab and Madras, is observed throughout 
the different age cohorts. Thus, the aggregate sex ratio is likely to capture the sex-bias for the Indian provinces in 
1901. 
  If sex ratio bias exists and occurs only in the early years, and if other environmental factors do not affect 
the female to male mortality ratio over time, then we can view the aggregate sex ratio as a weighted average of the 
sex-bias experiences of many differently aged-cohorts over time. For example, since the 45-50 aged cohort in 1901 
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childhood years between 1851-1865. Interpreted in this manner, the aggregate sex ratio captures the long-run 
historical average of the sex-bias in Indian society up to 1901.  
  By comparing sex ratios of 1901 cohorts at different ages over time by locating them in the 1911 census, 
we are able to identify at what ages the divergence in sex ratios arises. In Figures 2 and 3, the sex ratio of the 1901 
cohort (x-axis) is compared to its matched cohort in 1911. Thus, we examine the differences in sex ratios between 
cohorts aged 0-5 in 1901 with those 10-15 in 1911; 5-10 with 15-20, etc. The data suggest that if sex ratios diverged, 
then it was likely to occur in the early childhood years rather than in the adult years. 
  For Punjab, in Figure A2, the divergence in sex ratios occurs in the childhood years but not during 
adulthood. For cohorts aged 0-5 in 1901, the sex ratio falls significantly as they grow older to 10-15 in 1911; for the 
next cohort aged 5-10 in 1901, sex ratio falls to a lesser extent as they age to 15-20 in 1911. However, for those 
cohorts aged 15-20 and higher in the 1901 census, their respective sex ratios do not change as they grow older in 
1911. Thus, the cohort evidence suggests that most of the variations in the sex ratios may be driven by the variations 
in the childhood cohort data. 
  For Madras, shown in Figure A3, a slightly different picture emerges, but the aggregate sex ratio is also 
likely to be highly correlated with childhood sex ratios. In Madras, where son preference does not seem to exist, the 
sex ratio for younger aged cohorts do not diverge significantly as they age over time. However, for the slightly older 
cohort aged 10-15 in 1901, their sex ratio seems to decline significantly as they aged to 20-25 in 1911, perhaps 
reflecting the relatively higher female to male mortality caused by maternal deaths for women of childbearing ages. 
But these differences seem to reverse slightly for the next two aged cohorts. To the extent that maternal deaths 
impact the over-all sex ratio in Madras, our estimate is likely to provide a downward estimate of son preference 
in Madras. 
 



















































  50    Figure A2a: Sex Ratio by Age Cohort in Punjab, 1901-1911 









































Note: “cohort” lists age groups for 1901. For instance, the listed 0-5 age cohorts in 1901 (blue line) are 
compared to 10-15 age cohorts in 1911 (pink line) and so on. 
 
 
       Figure A2b: Sex Ratio by Age Cohort in Madras, 1901-1911 








































Note: “cohort” lists age groups for 1901. For instance, the listed 0-5 age cohorts in 1901 (blue line) are 













  51Appendix IV: Village Caste Distribution 
 
1. North: Malwa Village in the Princely State - Madhya Predesh, 1952 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
    Pop  (%)   Average  Area  (acres  per  person) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Khati  (farmer)    181  (19.8)  Rajput   24.40 
Rajput     118  (12.9)  Gosain   15.60 
Pinjara Muslim (cotton)    102 (11.3)  Farmer    11.30 
Balai  (weaver)    85  (9.3)   Gardener 11.25 
Camar  (tanner)    69  (7.6)   Brahman 10.86 
Bhilala     64  (7.0)   Fakir   9.99 
Gosain     45  (4.9)   Goatherd 8.81 
Teli  (oil  presser)    29  (3.2)   Tobacco   7.54 
Brahman   28  (3.1)   Oil-presser  7.34 
Ahir  (dairyman)    26  (2.9)   Cotton-carder  6.93 
Sutar  (carpenter)    25  (2.8)   Bhilala   5.94 
Nai  (barber)    14  (1.5)   Dairyman  5.88 
Nath       14  (1.5)   Potter   5.34 
Kumavat  (tobacco)   14  (1.5)   Barber   4.18 
Mali  (gardener)    13  (1.4)   Weaver   4.13 
Gari  (goatherd)    10  (1.1)   Balai  Babaji  3.36 
Darzi  (tailor)    9  (1.0)   Tailor   2.98 
Balai  Babaji    9  (1.0)   Mina   2.76 
Kumhar  (potter)    9  (1.0)   Bairagi   2.69 
Bhangi  (sweeper)    8  (0.9)   Nath   2.48 
Mina       8  (0.9)   Sweeper   1.63 
Lohar       8  (0.9)   Carpenter  1.55 
Doli     8  (0.9)   Tanner   1.20 
Bairagi     5  (0.5)   Drummer  1.12 
Bargunda (basketmaker)    5 (0.5)    Blacksmith  0.73 
Fakir  Muslim    4  (0.4) 
Bharbunjya    2  (0.2) 
 
Total     912  (100) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Mayer (1960) 
 
 
2. North: Eight Hamlets of Mauza Chadhiar, Kangra in the Hill Country North of Punjab, 1897 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
   Population   Landownership  (acres) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Rajput    1280    198 
Koli        867    122 
Leather-worker       364        63 
Weaver        162        28 
Brahman      122        19 
Girth-cultivator       102        17 
Temple priest        67        10 
Barber          37          4 
Jogi-ascetic        27          5 
Goldsmith        15          3 
Blacksmith        10          1 
Potter            7          1 
Musician          1          1 
  52 
Total    3061    472 
   (472  households) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Parry (1979, p.37-38) 
 
3. North: Rampur Village, Delhi in Punjab, 1953 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
    Population 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Jats     647   (own  most  of  the  land) 
Brahmans    110   (some  own  land) 
Camars (leatherworker)    107 
Bhangis (sweeper)      52 
Others     173 
 
Total     1080 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Others include: Kumhar (potter), Jhinvar (water carrier), Dhobi (washerman), Khati (carpenter), Nai (barber), Chipi 
(tailor), Lohar (blacksmith). 
Source: Lewis (1958). 
 
4. North: Mohana Village, Lucknow, UP, 1952 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
    Population  Landholdings  -  pakka  bighas 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Chamar     139   52  (12.6) 
Thakur     122   170  (41.3) 
Pasi     108   62  (15.0) 
A h i r      6 4    3 9   ( 9 . 4 )  
K u m h a r      3 3    3 5   ( 8 . 5 )  
D h o b i      3 3    1 3   ( 3 . 1 )  
Nai     16   1  (0.24) 
Barhai     14   9  (2.1) 
Kalwar     11   4  (0.97) 
Gadaria     12   14  (3.4) 
Lohar     7   2  (0.48) 
Brahmin     9   9  (2.18) 
B h a k s o r      6    0  
K u r m i      1    1   ( 0 . 2 4 )  
 
Total     311   411  (100.0) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Majumdar (1958. p.11-13). 
 
 
5. East: Ranjana, Midnapur - Bengal, 1960  
 
             Population 
   M a l e    F e m a l e  
 
Brahman      64        77 
Sadgope       162      145 
Bagdi        196      186 
Muci          21      14 
Dom        4      4 
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Santal        30       23 




Occupation   Brahmin   Sadgope   Bagdi   Muci   Muslim 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Cultivation         6   63   90   7   11 
Agri Labor      0      2    45    0      0 
S e r v i c e     1 2    2 1        9    0        0  
Teaching      9      6      0    0      0 
Business        5      4      0    0      0 
Priesthood    11      0      0    0      0 
Leather/Shoe      0      0      0    1      0 
Thatching      0      0      2    0      1 
Bell-metal      0      0    14    0      0 
Quackery      1      2      0    0      0 
 
Land  per  family   21.88   9.39   0.75   0.65   5.0 
 (bighas) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Distribution by bighas (6-15 is subsistence) 
0-6    11   27   83   9   3 
6-15    7   28   2   0   2 
15+    7   11   0   0   0 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Since most residents of Ranjana own very small plots of land, cultivation is composed of both small owner 
cultivation in combination of sharecropping of zamindari land. 
Source: Chattopadhyay (1964). 
 
 
6. South: Kumbapettai, Tanjore - Madras, 1952 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
      P o p u l a t i o n  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Brahman  
 Brahacharnam  Smartha    286 
 V a d a m a   S m a r t h a            7  
 Ayyangar       11 
 Kurukkal      15 
 T e l e g u   B r a h m a n            4  
‘Clean’ non-Brahman 
 Vellala  (landlord)           3 
 Kallan  (cattle  raiding)      39 
 Padaiyachi  (tenant  farmer)          8 
 Agamudaiyan  (tenant  farmer)     13 
  Telegu Nayakkan (tenant farmer)       3 
 Maratha  (courtier)         6 
 Konan  (cowherd)       74 
  Pusali (village temple priest)     16 
 Kusavan  (potter)       19 
 Tacchan  (carpenter)          3 
 Pattan  (goldsmith)          2 
 Kollan  (blacksmith)          2 
‘Pollutting’ non-Brahman 
  54  Tamil Nayakkan (toddy tapper)      39 
 Nadan  (toddy  tapper)        13 
 Ambalakkaran  (fisherman)      20 
‘Pollutting’ 
 Vannan  (washerman)          4 
 Ambattan  (barber)          8 
  Kuttadi (puppet-player, dancer)        8 
Adi Dravida 
  Korava (basket-maker, thief)       2 
  Devendra Pallan (landless laborer)    311 
  Tekkatti Pallan (landless laborer)      43 
  
Outsider Muslim (native doctor)          3 
 
T o t a l        9 6 2  
______________________________________________________________________________ 



































  55     R e f e r e n c e s  
 
Ahmad, Sghir. 1977. Class and Power in a Punjabi Village. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Agarwal, Bina. 1994. A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. New Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Agarwal, Bina. 1997. “‘Bargaining’ and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household,” 
Feminist Economics 3:1-51. 
Agarwala, S.N. 1957. “The Age at Marriage in India,” Population Index 2: 96-107. 
Bardhan, Pranab K. 1974. “On Life and Death Questions,” Economic and Political Weekly, 
August, 9 (32-34), Suppl.: 1293-1305. 
Baily, F. G. 1957. Caste and the Economic Frontier: A Village in Highland Orissa. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Bayly, Susan. 1999. Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the 
Modern Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bittle, A. H. 2002. “Endogamy, Consanguinity and Community Genetics,” Journal of Genetics 
81: 91-98. 
Blunt, E. A. H. 1931. The Caste System of Northern India. London: Oxford University Press. 
Botticini, Maristella and Aloysius Siow. 1993. “Why Dowries?” American Economic Review 93: 
1385-1398. 
Boserup, Ester. 1970. Women’s Role in Economic Development. London: George Allen and 
Unwin LTD. 
Caldwell, John C., P.H. Reddy, and Pat Caldwell. 1984. “The Determinants of Family Structure 
in Rural South India,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 46: 215-229. 
Chattopadhyay, Gouranga. 1964. Ranjana: A Village in West Bengal. Calcutta: Bookland Private 
Limited. 
Crooke, William. 1896. The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. 
Calcutta. 
Das Gupta, Monica, Jian Zhenghua, Li Bohua, Xie Zhenming, Woojin Chung, and Bae Hwa-Ok. 
2003. “Why is Son Preference so Persistent in East and South Asia? A Cross-Country 
Study of China, India and the Republic of Korea,” Journal of Development Studies 40: 
153-187. 
Dasgupta, Satadal. 1986. Caste Kinship and Community: Social System of a Bengal Caste. 
Madras: University Press. 
Dirks, Nicholas B. 1993. The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom. Second 
Edition. University of Michigan Press. 
Dumont, Louis. 1957. “Hierarchy and Marriage Alliance in South Indian Kinship,” Occasional 
Papers of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland No.12. 
London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 
Dumont, Louis. 1986. A South Indian Subcaste: Social Organization and Religion of the 
Pramalai Kallar. Oxford: Oxfrod University Press. 
Dyson, Tim and Mick Moore. 1983. “On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and 
Demographic Behavior in India,” Population and Development Review 9 (1): 35-60. 
Edlund, Lena. 1999. “Son Preference, Sex-ratios, and Marriage Patterns,” Journal of Political 
Economy 107 (6): 1275-1304. 
Eglar, Zekiye. 1960. A Punjabi Village in Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press. 
  56Folbre, Nancy. 1997. “Gender Coalitions: Extrafamily Influences on Intrafamily Inequality,” in 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Models, Methods, and 
Policy, edited by L. Haddad, J. Hoddinott, and H. Alderman, Johns Hopkins University. 
Foster, Andrew D. 1993. “Household Partition in Rural Bangladesh,” Population Studies 47: 97-
114. 
Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2001. “Missing Women, the Marriage Market and 
Economic Growth,” mimeo. 
Fox, Richard. 1971. Kin Clan Raja and Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fox, Robin. 1967. Kinship and Marriage. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
Freitas, Kripa. 2006. “The Indian Caste System as a Means of Contract Enforcement,” mimeo. 
Goody, Jack. 1973. “Bridewealth and Dwry in Africa and Eurasia,” in Bridewealth and Dowry 
edited by J. Goody and S.J. Tambiah. Cambridge University Press. 
Gough, E. Kathleen. 1952. “Changing Kinship Usages in the Setting of Political and Economic 
Change Among the Nayars of Malabar,” Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute 82: 
71-87. 
Gough, E. Kathleen. 1955. “The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village,” in Village India, M. 
Marriott, editor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gough, E. Kathleen. 1956. “Brahmin Kinship in a Tamil Village,” American Anthropologist 58: 
826-853. 
Gough, E. Kathleen. 1960. “Caste in a Tanjore Village,” in Aspects of Caste in South India, 
Ceylon, and North-West Pakistan, E. R. Leach, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gough, E. Kathleen. 1961. Matrilineal Kinship (edited with David M. Schneider). Berkeley: 
University of Californial Press. 
Gough, E. Kathleen. 1979. “Dravidian Kinship and Modes of Production,” Contributions to 
Indian Sociology 13 (2): 265-291. 
Gould, Harold A. 1960. “The Micro-Demography of Marriages in a North Indian Area,” 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 16: 476-491. 
Greif, Avner. 2005. “Family Structure, Institutions and Growth: The Origin and Implication of 
Western Corporation,” mimeo. 
Greif, Avner. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval 
Trade. Cambridge University Press. 
Hershman, Paul. 1981. Punjabi Kinship and Marriage. Delhi: Hindustan Publishing. 
Hoddinott, John and Lawrence Haddad. 1995. “Does Female Income Share Influence Household 
Expenditures? Evidence from Cote D’Ivore,” Oxford Bulletin of Economic and Statistics 
57: 77-96. 
Ibbetson, Denzil. 1916 [1974]. Panjab Castes. Lahore: SH Mubarak Ali. 
Kapur, Shilpi and Sukkoo Kim. 2006. “British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development 
in India,” NBER Working Paper #12613. 
Karve, Irawati. 1990. Kinship Organization in India. Third Edition. New Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal Publishers. 
Khuda, Barkat E. 1985. “The Nuclearization of the Joint Family Household in Rural Areas of 
Bangladesch,” Journal of Comparative Familiy Studies 16: 387-400. 
Kishor, Sunita. 1993. “ ‘May God Give Sons to All’: Gender and Child Mortality in India,” 
American Sociological Review 58: 247-265. 
Kolenda, Pauline. 1987. Regional Differences in Family Structure in India. Rawat Publications. 
  57Kranton, Rachel E. 1996. “Reciprocal Exchange: A Sefl-Sustaining System,” American 
Economic Review 86: 830-851. 
Kroeber, Alfred L. 1909. “Classificatory Systems of Relationship,” Journal of Royal 
Anthropological Institute 39: 77-84. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1969. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Lewis, Oscar. 1958. Village Life in Northern India. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Ludden, David. 1985. Peasant History in South India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lundberg, Shelly J. and Robert A. Pollak. 1993. “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage 
Market,” Journal of Political Economy 101: 988-1010. 
Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terence J. Wales. 1997. “Do Husbands and Wives 
Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit,” Journal of 
Human Resources 32 (3): 463-480. 
Mandelbaum, David G. 1970. Society in India. Two volumes. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Manser, Marilyn and Murray Brown. 1980. “Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A 
Bargaining Analysis,” International Economic Review 21: 31-44. 
Mathur, Divya. 2007. “What’s Love Got To Do With It? Parental Involvement and Spouse 
Choice in Urban India,” mimeo. 
Mayer, Adrian C. 1960. Caste and Kinship in Central India. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Mayer, Peter. 1999. “India’s Falling Sex-ratios,” Population and Development Review 25 (2): 
323-343. 
McElroy, Marjorie B. and Mary J. Horney. 1981. “Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: 
Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand,” International Economic Review 22: 
333-349. 
Mencher, Joan P. 1966. “Kerala and Madras: A Comparative Study of Ecology and Social 
Structure,” Ethnology 5 (2): 135-172. 
Mencher, Joan P. and Helen Goldberg. 1967. “Kinship and Marriage Regulations Among the 
Namboodiri Brahmans of Kerala,” Man 2 (1): 87-107. 
Miller, Barbara. 1981. The Endangered Sex: Neglect of Female Children in Rural North India. 
Second Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Miller, Eric J. 1954. “Caste and Territory in Malabar,” American Anthropolists 56: 410-420. 
Moffatt, Michael. 1979. An Untouchable Community in South India: Structure and Consensus. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Morgan, Lewis H. 1871. Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family. 
Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution. 
Mujumdar, D. N. 1958. Caste and Communication in an Indian Village. Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House. 
Munshi, Kaivan and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2005. “Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social 
Insurance, Inequality and Growth,” mimeo. 
Murthi, Mamta, Anne-Catherine Guio, and Jean Dreze. 1995. “Mortality, Fertility, and Gender 
Bias in India: A District-Level Analysis,” Population and Development Review 21 (4): 
745-782. 
Nasir, Rosina and A. K. Kalla. 2006. “Kinship System, Fertility and Son Preference among the 
Muslims: A Review,” Anthropologist 8: 275-281. 
  58Nesfield, J. C. 1885. Brief View of the Caste System of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. 
Allahabad. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton University 
Press. 
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2006. “A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History,” mimeo. 
Oster, Emily. 2005. “Hepatitis B and the Case of Missing Women,” Journal of Political 
Economy 113 (6): 1163-1216. 
Park, Chai Bin and Nam-Hoon Cho. 1995. “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility 
Society: Imbalance of the Sex-ratio at Birth in Korea,” Population and Development 
Review 21 (1): 59-84. 
Parry, Jonathan P. 1979. Caste and Kinship in Kangra. London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul. 
Pradhan, M.C. 1966. The Political System of the Jats of Northern India. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Qian, Nancy. 2006. “Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-Specific 
Earnings on Sex Imblance,” mimeo. 
Risley, H. H. 1892. The Tribes and Castes of Bengal. 2 volumes. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat 
Press. 
Rose, Elaina. 1999. “Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 81: 41-49. 
Russell, R. V. 1916. The Tribes and Castes of the Central Province of India. 4 volumes. London. 
Macmillan and Company. 
Sastri, Nilakanta. 1976. A History of South India. Fourth Ed. Madras: Oxford University Press. 
Sen, Amartya. 1990. “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing,” New York Times, Volume 
37, Number 20, Dec. 20.  
Shah, A. M. 1977. “Lineage Structure and Change in a Gujarat Village,” in Dimensions of Social 
Change in India, M. N. Srinivas, S. Seshaiah and V. S. Parthasarthy, eds., Bombay: 
Allied Publishing House. 
Sontheimer, Günther-Dietz. 1977. The Joint Hindu Family: Its Evolution as a Legal Institution. 
New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 
Srinivas, M. N. 1976. The Remembered Village. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Stein, Burton. 1994. Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stein, Burton. 1998. A History of India. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Stone, Linda. 1997. Kinship and Gender: An Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Tambiah, S. J. 1973. “Dowry and Bridewealth and the Property Rights of Women in South 
Asia,” in Bridewealth and Dowry edited by J. Goody and S.J. Tambiah. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Thapar, Romila. 1984. From Lineage to State: Social Formations in the Mid-First Millennium 
B.C. in the Ganga Valley. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Thomas, Duncan. 1990. “Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach,” 
Journal of Human Resources 24: 635-664. 
Thomas, Duncan. 1994. “Life Father, Like Son; Like Mother, Like Daughter: Parental Resources 
and Child Height,” Journal of Human Resources 29: 950-988. 
  59Thurston, Edgar. 1909. Castes and Tribes of Southern India. 7 volumes. Madras. 
Trautmann, Thomas. 1993. [1979]. “The Study of Dravidian Kinship,” in Family, Kinship and 
Marriage in India, P. Uberoi, ed., Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Trautmann, Thomas. 1981. Dravidian Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Visaria, Pravin M. 1961. The Sex-ratio of the Population of India. Census of India, Volume 1: 
Monograph 10. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs. 
  60